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Intellectual Property Doctrine and 
Midlevel Principles 
David H. Blankfein-Tabachnick* 
Recent scholarship on intellectual property ("IP ") law argues 
that doctrinal and theoretical sophistication in IP requires an 
understanding of "mid/eve/" principles, purportedly constitutive of 
IP 's positive law. Proponents of this line of scholarship claim these 
principles serve as a bridge, connecting IP doctrine and practice 
with deeper foundational philosophical principles. They assert that 
such mid/eve/ principles-the principles of proportionality, non-
removal, dignity, and efficiency, for instance-explain, predict, and 
justify IP cases. According to this scholarship, IP doctrine, case 
outcomes, and statutes are suffused with mid/eve/ principles. In turn, 
the scholarship treats mid/eve/ principles as consistent with broadly 
conflicting foundational accounts of property entitlement, from 
Lockean liberalism on the economic right, to Raw/sian 
egalitarianism on the left. The result is an account of IP law that 
unifies practice and the positive law with facially conflicting 
accounts of foundational property theories. This Essay argues that 
such claims to IP unification-however revolutionary-are 
untenable. Drawing from prominent IP cases, including cases 
addressing the patentability of DNA, this Essay demonstrates that 
mid/eve/ principles are not rigorously embodied in the positive law of 
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IP and therefore cannot serve to explain or predict case outcomes. 
Further, these mid/eve/ principles conflict with important liberal 
"foundational" accounts of property, thereby calling into question 
the justificatory force such principles might hold. Moreover, contrary 
to Professor Robert P. Merges's view, different foundational 
principles, whether maximizing wealth, net aggregate value, or the 
position of the least well-off, will yield different substantive outcomes 
in IP cases. Accordingly, this Essay shows that any project 
conjoining this set of mid level principles with maximizing distributive 
principles cannot be sustained. A sophisticated understanding of IP, 
its theory, and crucially its legal doctrine and practice, does not, and 
should not, include mid/eve/ principles understood to be consistent 
with such variously competing foundations. Instead, this Essay 
acknowledges that courts deciding IP cases often invoke forward-
looking foundational principles, whether aimed at utility or 
distributive justice. 
Introduction ................................................................................................... 131 7 
I. Merges's View oflntellectual Property ............................................. 1321 
II. Midlevel Principles and Private Law ................................................. 1323 
A. Midlevel Strategies and Private Law Independence ..................... 1323 
1. Ronald Dworkin and Justification of Legal Decisions .......... 1324 
2. Corrective Justice Conception of Tort Law ........................... 1325 
B. Cases and Statutes: The Positive Law of IP and Midlevel 
Principles ................................................................................... 1328 
1. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C. ....................................... 1329 
2. Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp . ........................ 1332 
C. Midlevel Analysis in Light of eBay and Ethicon .......................... 1335 
III. Foundations and Midlevel Principles ................................................ 1336 
A. Pluralism ....................................................................................... 1338 
B. Conflicting Conceptions of Liberalism and Property Theory ....... 1341 
1. Pre- and Post-Political Values ............................................... 1342 
2. Post-Institutional Maximizing Foundations ........................... 1342 
3. The Incompatibility ................................................................ 1343 
IV. Baselines: Commons vs. Anti-Commons and Asset Partitioning ...... 1344 
A. The Commons and the Anti-Commons ........................................ 1345 
B. Property Baselines Questions ....................................................... 1346 
V. Patents: The "Building Blocks" of Creation and Invention, DNA 
Patents and Prometheus v. Mayo and Myriad ................................... 1349 
A. Pharmaceutical Patents and Policy ............................................... 1349 
B. DNA as Patent Eligible Subject Matter: Mayo and Myriad .......... 1350 
Conclusion .................................................................................................... 1359 
2013] IP DOCTRINE AND MIDLEVEL PRINCIPLES 1317 
INTRODUCTION 
A rethinking in intellectual property is underway. Technological and 
biomedical advances, 1 together with globalization and economic development, 
have drawn a spotlight on intellectual property law and its theory? As the topic 
has entered the foreground, it has not only captured the attention and 
imagination of politicians and legal scholars, but has also been playing a role in 
federal court cases, most recently cases before the Supreme Court of the United 
States concerning DNA and the "law of nature" exception to patentable subject 
matter.3 Alternative IP regimes, much like competing accounts of tort, 
bankruptcy, or systems of taxation and transfer, can alter wealth distribution, 
income disparity, and economic growth, by variously altering the incentives to 
creation. 
As a matter of institutional design, questions about wealth distribution, 
income disparity, and economic growth have traditionally been associated with 
public law such as tax policy.4 Yet, legal scholars have also come to appreciate 
the role that private law, such as IP, might play in achieving economic or social 
goals. Rights to control the building blocks of invention and the fruits of 
creation are crucial to welfare distribution; whether wealth maximization or the 
broader concerns of social justice, say, maximizing the position of the least 
well-off. As a result, the connection between public values and legal 
institutions constructing private rights is receiving sustained, rigorous 
attention. 5 
Legal scholars acknowledge a close relationship between public law, 
taken to address distributive or economic values, and private law, taken to 
address private interests. Some scholars even question where in law such a 
distinction might lie, given the difficulty isolating the extent to which particular 
bodies of law represent public versus private rights. Leon Green, for example, 
described private law as merely "public law in disguise."6 Further, the 
1. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); 
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
2. See generally AIDAN HOLLIS & THOMAS POGGE, INCENTNES FOR GLOBAL PuB. HEALTH, 
THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND: MAKING NEW MEDICINES ACCESSIBLE FOR ALL (2008); INCENTIVES 
FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH: PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 233 (Thomas 
Pogge eta!. eds., 2010) [hereinafter INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH]; ROBERT P. MERGES, 
JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (20 II); MADHA VI SUNDER, fROM GooDS TO A GooD LIFE: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE (2012); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as 
Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742 (2007). 
3. See, e.g., Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1289; Ass'nfor Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1303. 
4. See, e.g., LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND 
JUSTICE (2002); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the 
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994); Louis Kaplow & Steven 
Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? ClarifYing the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax 
in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL. STUD. 821 (2000). 
5. See, e.g., INCENTNES FOR GLOBAL PuBLIC HEALTH, supra note 2; MERGES, supra note 2; 
SUNDER, supra note 2. 
6. Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REV. I, 1 (1959). 
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purported lack of any clear distinction between public law and private law has 
at times even led scholars to call into question the very idea of private property 
itsele In keeping with Green's proclamation, some scholars have understood 
private law in instrumentalist fashion, that is, in service of public, distributive, 
or economic values.8 
The legal academy has long recognized these observations; yet, the role 
that private law-specifically IP law-might play in fulfilling economic and 
social goals is enjoying new attention.9 This interest in IP law has produced a 
need for new understanding in the field-that is, an analysis of IP law's 
doctrinal contours, theory, and precise relationship to broader background 
values, along with a treatment of IP that contrasts it with the spirit of Green's 
proclamation. In other words, there is a need to articulate IP law's private law 
dimensions and properly situate them in the sea of public values. 
More than any other legal scholar, Robert Merges10 has succeeded in so 
situating IP law. Through a series of groundbreaking articles, 11 culminating in 
Justifying Intellectual Property, 12 he has provided a comprehensive analysis of 
IP law from its foundations and midlevel principles to its doctrine and 
practice. 13 His work not only aims to describe, explain and justify IP law, but 
also attempts to use midlevel principles to unify the field's foundational theory 
with its doctrine and practice. 14 
Clarification here may be helpful. Midlevel principles are the principles 
upon which actual institutions operate. Decisions made within institutions are 
made on the basis of midlevel principles without any direct reference to deeper 
7. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (extending procedural rights to welfare 
revocation); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (arguing that so-called 
public institutional rights are actually among one's private assets). 
8. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND EcONOMIC ANALYSIS 
(1970) (arguing that torts are instrumental in achieving distributive ends); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007) (exploring various areas of law through the concept of 
wealth maximization); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder 
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991) (arguing that corporate and bankruptcy law 
constructed so as to maximize wealth would require giving preference to tort creditors over contract 
creditors in bankruptcy so as tO avoid the externalization of accident costs); Anthony T. Kronrnan, 
Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 483-88 (1980) (considering, for example, 
Paretianism and Utilitarianism as exogenous distributive goals to instrumentally guide contract 
doctrine). 
9. See SUNDER, supra note 2. 
10. Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall). 
11. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REv. 1293 (1996); Robert Merges, Intellectual Property 
Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REv. 75 (1994); 
Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655 
(1994). 
12. MERGES, supra note 2. 
13. See generally MERGES, supra note 2. 
14. !d. at 140-43. For a detailed description of Merges's tripartite account ofiP law, see David 
H. Blankfein-Tabachnick, Does Intellectual Property Have Foundations? A Review of Robert 
Merges's Justifying Intellectual Property, 45 CONN. L. REV. 995 (2013) (book review). 
2013] IP DOCTRINE AND MIDLEVEL PRINCIPLES 1319 
or more foundational principles of comprehensive or general application, such 
as Rawls's two principles of justice15 derived from the "original position,"16 
Kant's categorical imperative, or the utility principle. 
Based on such rnidlevel principles, Merges has argued for an independent 
rights-based account of IP law broken into three parts: doctrine and practice, 
midlevel principles, and theoretical foundations. 17 Central to his view are 
midlevel principles purportedly eminent in IP's positive law, such as 
proportionality, 18 non-removal/ 9 dignity,20 and efficiency.21 These midlevel 
principles exist in contrast to foundational principles of Locke, Kant, and 
Rawls. He argues that these midlevel principles, limited in their scope, serve as 
a bridge connecting IP doctrine and practice with broader, more foundational, 
property principles or theories. They, not the foundational principles, are taken 
to justify IP cases. For Merges, IP doctrine, case outcomes, and statutes are 
suffused with the values of midlevel principles; and midlevel principles, in 
15. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 302 (1971) [hereinafter THEORY OF JUSTICE] ("First 
Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. Second Principle: Social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, 
consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity."). 
16. Id. at 17-22. The Original Position ("OP") is Rawls's idealized social choice scenario in 
which representatives select political and economic principles so as to maximize their self-interest 
under less than perfect knowledge conditions from behind a veil of ignorance. 
17. MERGES, supra note 2, at ix ("I wanted to defend IP rights against a host of charges . . . 
that the field is ... incoherent ... that IP, whatever it is, is not really property .... [and] suggest some 
ways that this area oflaw could be trimmed and tailored to better serve its main purpose, which for me 
has always been protecting creative works ... and rewarding creative people."). 
18. Id. at 8 (describing the proportionality principle as embodying a conflict between utility 
and fairness, while acknowledging the Lockean pre-institutional aspects of the principle that I will later 
show draw it into conflict with Rawlsianism) ("IP law ... tailor[s] a creator's ... right ... [to] reflect[] 
his contribution. This is the proportionality principle. There is a ... Lockean flavor to [it] ... (though it 
makes sense on utilitarian grounds as well) .... [I]t is about basic fairness: the scope of a[n] [IP] right 
ought to be commensurate with the magnitude of the [creator's] contribution .... ").Again, invoking 
such a vague conception of proportionality, or fairness, that it might even be viewed as consistent with 
utilitarianism, a theory typically rejected specifically due to its purported conflict with fairness or 
justice. 
19. Id. at 145 (describing the functional outcome of his vague principle of nonremoval, but 
purposefully avoiding a definitive account) ("[The public]) domain ... is the end product of the 
nonremoval principle .... [I]t is the product of many disparate doctrines ... not itself ... a unitary 
concept, we ... see a ... diversity in conceptions of it."). 
20. Id. at 156 (committed again to avoiding a precise definition, but instead describing the 
nature of the value at stake) ("The dignity principle ... [holds that] ... the creator of a work should be 
respected and recognized in ways that extend beyond the traditional package of rights associated with 
property .... [T]he interests it protects ... continue after a creator sells the rights to a given creative 
work."). 
21. Id. at 153 (straightforwardly conflicting with the other midlevel values Merges describes, 
for example, the conception of fairness embodied in his midlevel principle of proportionality; this 
appears a good deal stronger than Merges may have intended) ("Efficiency guarantees that whatever 
entitlements the legal system starts with, they will be allocated to their highest-valued use as cheaply 
and quickly as possible."). 
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tum, are consistent with a wide range of seemingly conflicting foundational 
accounts of property entitlement, ranging from Locke to Kant to Rawls. 22 
This Essay addresses Merges's argument and situates his view of IP law 
in the contemporary debate over the independence of private law from 
economic, social, or distributive goals. Merges's account of IP law embraces a 
midlevel strategy, aiming to demonstrate the independence of IP law from 
background values, and to unify IP with general foundational political 
principles. 23 Merges finds doctrinal support for his midlevel principles in the 
prominent eBay case,24 but this Essay finds inconclusive evidence of such 
principles in eBay. Further, this Essay argues that such midlevel principles also 
did not play a decisive doctrinal role in Federal Circuit cases such as 
Ethicon25and Myriad, 26 nor in the recent United States Supreme Court case, 
Mayo. 27 The piece concludes that the substance of the midlevel principles 
Merges's espouses, in addition to his methodology, is incompatible with the 
foundational theories he advances, specifically Rawlsianism.28 
My argument is broken into several parts. First, Part I describes and 
analyzes Merges's account of IP law. Part II discusses prominent accounts of 
the independence of midlevel legal principles from foundational values, 
including Ronald Dworkin's analysis ofmidlevel values, legal rule making, and 
the corrective justice conception of tort. This Part situates Merges's account of 
IP law in this literature. Further, this Part looks at IP cases and finds that 
Merges's midlevel principles are not reflected in the positive law ofiP. Part III 
suggests that foundational property theories, especially Rawlsianism, are not 
compatible with Merges's midlevel principles, and addresses Merges's 
pluralistic midlevel-principle strategy for resolving foundational property 
disputes. This Part holds that IP law disagreements run deeper than midlevel 
principles. Part IV addresses what remains if we reject Merges's account. It 
discusses the crucial role foundational principles play in setting property 
baselines and asset portioning. Part V illustrates the demand for foundational 
22. Id. at 13, 139. 
23. Id. at 140 (adopting the midlevel private law strategy typically associated with the 
corrective justice conception of tort). See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN 
DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 54 (2001) (stating that the principle of 
corrective justice "occupies a mid-level between the practices of tort law and an upper-level principle 
of fairness in allocating the costs of life's misfortunes"); Arthur Ripstein, The Division of 
Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 1811, 1814-15 (2004) (stating that private 
law-tort, contract, property and unjust enriclunent-must have a certain kind of independence, but 
can be limited by the concerns of public justice). 
24. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
25. See, e.g, Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
26. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). 
27. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct 1289 (2012). 
28. Prior to the Mayo decision, I noted my skepticism with regard to Merges's claim that his 
midlevel principles constitute the positive law of IP and questioned Merges's general claim to 
unification in IP law. See Blankfein-Tabachnick, supra note 14. 
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principles in the context of pharmaceutical patents and discusses the recent 
Mayo and Myriad decisions. It concludes that differing foundational theories 
will yield differing substantive conclusions in such cases and therefore, a claim 
of unification in IP law-ambitious and elegant as it may be-is unsustainable. 
I. 
MERGES'S VIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
For Merges, IP law requires an understanding of what he describes as 
"midlevel principles," purportedly, eminent in IP's positive law. These 
principles, which include proportionality, non-removal, dignity and efficiency, 
act as a bridge, connecting IP doctrine and practice with deeper foundational 
principles, such as the grand political theories of Kant, Locke and Rawls. Such 
midlevel principles are taken to explain, predict, and justify IP cases. In 
Merges's view, IP doctrine, case outcomes, and statutes are suffused with such 
midlevel principles, which he believes are consistent with foundational 
accounts of property entitlement. The result is an account of IP law that 
ostensibly justifies and explains IP practice and the positive law of IP, and 
unifies them with facially conflicting foundational accounts of property, while 
preserving IP's independent status as a species of private law. The aim, then, is 
to show not only that IP law is an independent and systematic body of law, but 
also that it is also consistent with a wide range of background values 
represented by foundational property theories.29 
In making his case, Merges draws an analogy between IP law and the 
corrective justice conception of tort law (discussed in Part II). He understands 
IP as being governed, like tort and the theory of corrective justice, by a group 
of values that bears a level of independence from background or foundational 
principles. In this view, IP's practices and doctrine internalize a unique set of 
governing norms: its midlevel principles. These midlevel norms cannot be 
derived directly from foundational principles, and are not instrumental to the 
institutional instantiation of any particular foundational theory. 
Instead, understanding this unique set of regulatory norms is a matter of 
"identifying midlevel principles"30 and this, for Merges, "is an inductive 
exercise"31 that begins with legal doctrine, not foundational theory. 
Innovatively, Merges appears to derive justification and legal theory in reverse. 
He starts with actual doctrine and practice and, by his own description, 
abstracts "up-ward" toward the law's "foundations." 32 In his own words, "one 
looks for the common conceptual threads in a field and treats them as instances 
or manifestations of a more complete principle. The idea is to start with 
29. MERGES, supra note 2, at 1-27. 
30. /d. at 140. 
31. !d. 
32. !d. 
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ground-level practices and abstract 'upward,' toward a unifying principle that 
explains and rationalizes the practices."33 
For Merges, then, IP doctrine is governed or controlled by a set of small-
bore normative, midlevel principles that can be located by moving up a level, 
abstracting from doctrine and practice. In this view, midlevel principles, 
abstract as they are, are implicit in IP. If one starts by examining IP case law, 
one is faced with what might appear to be disconnected and differing rules and 
holdings. This is understandable: IP doctrine and its various rules have 
developed over time, in differing jurisdictions and in response to the needs and 
factual contingencies of differing eras. Yet, for Merges, there is still the 
possibility of systematizing these divergent rules and doctrines. Merges 
laudably aims to provide structure to what might otherwise appear incoherent, 
incomplete, or indeterminate. 
Legal doctrine in IP lacks obvious uniformity. Yet, for Merges, there are 
unifying norms, and these norms, implicit as they are, may be identified 
through inductive reasoning, and serve a needed justificatory role for IP 
doctrine.34 For Merges, these unifying norms are the midlevel principles of IP 
law. One "induce[s] the principle[s] from the details of the specific rules and 
practices."35 Since Merges derives midlevel principles from doctrine and 
practice, and not from any one specified foundational theory, there is the 
possibility these midlevel principles overlap with a range of foundational 
approaches to property. 
Merges is clear: midlevel principles do not "depend" upon, nor are they 
derived from, "any particular" foundation.36 Given his methodology, overlap 
between midlevel principles and foundations is possible, but this will tum on 
the substance of the midlevel principles and lack of determinacy found in the 
application of the foundational principles he espouses. 
But apart from the question of consistency between midlevel principles 
and foundations, there remains the question of justification. While such 
principles might predict or explain case outcomes or systematize IP law, it is 
unclear why one might conceive of such principles as justificatory simply 
because they are implicit in IP doctrine. Even if Merges were correct that such 
midlevel principles do serve as the regulatory norms of IP doctrine, it would 
not follow that these free-floating norms are justificatory. Demonstrating that 
these midlevel principles are implicit in IP law and that they serve to predict, 
33. !d. 
34. !d. at 140-43 (articulating a justificatory role, "this is their role exactly: [midlevel values] 
enable nonnative debate-debate above the detailed doctrinal level," but also claiming that the 
mid! eve I principles ''tie[] together and explains each of these rules in tenns of a broader conception") 
(emphasis added). 
35. !d. at 143. 
36. !d. at 140. 
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explain, or govern IP doctrine is a distinct task from providing a justificatory 
account ofiP. 
The concern is this: Merges denies that foundational principles exert 
regulatory force or control upon IP's midlevel principles. While this approach 
preserves the possibility of consistency or overlap between midlevel principles 
and a range of differing (justificatory) foundational property theories, it does so 
at significant cost to the possibility of justifying IP. If the correct foundational 
theories exert no controlling force over midlevel principles, midlevel principles 
would seem, at best, to help explain, predict, or even control, as opposed to 
justify IP law. 
Yet, Merges's thinking is sophisticated. He alludes to a connection 
between midlevel principles and foundational values: "[ m ]idlevel principles 
engage foundational values in a number of ways, but they do not depend on any 
particular set of values for their validity."37 The nature of this "engagement," 
however, remains unclear. Given Merges's claim that midlevel principles are 
independent from foundations, one wonders if this "engagement" is nothing 
more than a contingent overlap or empirical regularity between foundations and 
midlevel principles. But such overlap may be insufficient to justify IP law. In a 
more satisfying approach, the "engagement" of foundational values and 
midlevel principles would involve guidance rather than chance overlap, 
although such a view would be incompatible with Merges's claim to midlevel 
independence. 
II. 
MID LEVEL PRINCIPLES AND PRIVATE LAW 
A. Mid/eve/ Strategies and Private Law Independence 
Merges, of course, is not the first to discuss this sort of midlevel approach 
to common law judicial decision making. This Part discusses prominent 
accounts of the independence of midlevel principles from foundational 
values-first, Ronald Dworkin's view of the justification for legal decisions 
and then the corrective justice conception of tort law-and situates Merges's 
account of IP law in this literature. It concludes that Merges's arguments for 
unification are not supported by these two rnidlevel accounts. Unlike Merges, 
neither Dworkin nor the corrective justice account of tort law make any claim 
to the consistency between foundational maximizing values and midlevel 
principles. Setting aside the question of the ultimate viability of midlevel 
normative strategies in judicial decision making, this Part shows that the 
possibility of unification between midlevel principles and the plurality of 
foundational values that Merges espouses is problematic. 
37. !d. (emphasis added). 
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1. Ronald Dworkin and Justification of Legal Decisions 
Ronald Dworkin defends something akin to Merges's approach,38 
distinguishing between background morality and the justification of legal 
decisions. Dworkin distinguishes between "background rights, which ... 
provide a justification for political decisions by society . . . and institutional 
rights, that provide a justification for a decision by some ... specified political 
institution."39 Merges's ideas seem akin to Dworkin's. However, Dworkin's 
view avoids--or side steps-the crucial normative problem of "engagement" 
between foundational and midlevel principles. Unlike Merges, Dworkin 
presents two distinct forms of justification questions: ( 1) the sort of justification 
involved in a judge reaching a legal decision and (2) justification involved in a 
legislative act or a wholesale reform or creation of a body of law.4° For 
Dworkin, the two modes of justification, contra Merges's view, need not be, 
and are often not, compatible with one another.41 
Although Merges purports to provide a justificatory account of IP law, he 
does not elaborate upon which of those two justification problems he is 
addressing, but maintains nevertheless that midlevel principles and foundations 
are compatible. Of the two, Merges's inductive-midlevel procedure likely best 
fits Dworkin's legal argument, but this mode ·of legal analysis appears very odd 
indeed from the legislative or foundational perspective. 
For Dworkin, a judge's argument, but not the legislature's, is insulated 
from, or independent of, what he calls "background" morality.42 Perhaps this is, 
to some extent, what Merges has in mind by the "independence" of midlevel 
principles. In Dworkin's view, however, judges are not in the position of 
lawmakers, who have the freedom to ask straightforwardly what the law should 
be and appeal to, in Merges's language, "foundational principles." It is the 
legislature that may determine what the best law might be in light of 
foundational principles, subject to constitutional limitations. 
On the other hand, judges, for Dworkin, do not have such liberty. Their 
role is not to decide what the best law would be from the perspective of 
background morality, but instead to apply the legal standards given by the legal 
system. For Dworkin, but seemingly not Merges, the legal system may be, and 
38. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 93-94, 101, 103, 105 (1977). 
39. !d. at 93. 
40. !d. at 93-94, 101, 103, 105. 
41. !d. at 93 (discussing the prominent conflict in property matters between the "institutional" 
values involved in judicial decision making and competing "background" conceptions of morality and 
property entitlement) ("! could preserve my initial background claim by arguing that the people as a 
whole would be justified in amending the Constitution to abolish [or alter] property, or perhaps in 
rebelling and over-throwing the present form of government .... [E]ven though I concede that [one] 
does not have the right to specific [judicial] institutional decisions as these institutions are now 
constituted."). 
42. !d. at 101 ("[T]he concrete rights upon which judges rely must have two characteristics. 
They must be institutional rather than background rights, and they must be legal rather than some other 
form of institutional rights."). 
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probably is, less than ideal, or inconsistent with the correct account of 
background morality. Where the judge cannot simply apply a clear precedent or 
statute, the judge is to look for principles that are inherent in the legal system, 
midlevel principles, which would settle the case.43 
The method Dworkin describes may very well be similar to the inductive 
method Merges advocates, but for Dworkin, although crucially not Merges, 
there is no demand that the principles discovered through the inductive method 
are consistent with the fundamental or background principles that anyone, even 
the judge, would accept.44 For Dworkin, the judge is not empowered to make a 
direct or naked appeal to foundational principles. The judge's role, instead, is to 
apply the inherent principles of the legal system to the case at hand. It is in this 
sense that, for Dworkin, legal decisions are independent from background 
morality. 
Dworkin avoids Merges's would-be unification train, by disavowing a 
requirement of consistency between background morality and midlevel or 
common law principles.45 One may, of course, raise normative objections to 
Dworkin's account given the possibility of this conflict. But, if one accepts a 
picture of judicial or midlevel independence like Dworkin's, as Merges appears 
to, it quickly becomes urgent to know exactly how these two frameworks can 
be consistent with one another and, further, how foundational values might 
regulate, constrain, or control midlevel principles, which is a requirement of 
Merges's normative and conceptual unification. 
2. Corrective Justice Conception of Tort Law 
There are other viable accounts of midlevel principles. In fact, Merges 
explicitly embraces the account of midlevel principles and their relationship to 
"lower" and "upper" values typically associated with a corrective justice 
conception of tort law.46 The idea here is that corrective justice is understood as 
a moral principle--or group of moral principles-taken to be independent of 
distributive justice. Distributive justice purportedly concerns itself with social 
justice, while corrective justice addresses the causation of private harm and the 
private duty of repair. The principle of corrective justice is thought to generate 
a moral duty of repair: that is, a backward-looking duty to pay compensation, in 
economic terms, for harm that one has caused another though wrongful or 
43. /d. 
44. /d. at 93. Dworkin is skeptical of the compatibility of competing foundational accounts of 
justice in property entitlements and correspondingly notes that divergent foundational accounts of 
property may conflict with institutional rules. 
45. /d. 
46. MERGES, supra note 2, at 139-42 (articulating the account of midlevel principles he 
endorses); see also id. at 139 ("Midlevel principles ... tie together a number of discrete and detailed 
doctrines, rules, and practices .... In tort law, for example, legal doctrines such as negligence and 
strict liability, together with ... accident insurance, constitute the gritty detail of the field. What ties 
these disparate details together ... is the [midlevel] principle of 'corrective justice' .... "). 
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defective action.47 Typically, only harm caused either by morally faulty or 
unreasonably risky action is thought to be necessary (though not sufficient) for 
the imposition of liability. Proponents of corrective justice often also hold that 
such liability for harm caused by one's faulty or unreasonably risky action must 
be, in some measure, fair or reasonably proportional to the harm caused.48 
While Merges enthusiastically accepts aspects of this methodological 
multi-level discussion of tort and corrective justice, it is unclear that this 
midlevel account49 will so smoothly slide into place in Merges's own account 
of IP law, given his overarching goal of unifying actual IP doctrine, midlevel 
principles, and foundations. 
Contra Merges, this corrective justice account of tort law makes no 
demand for the unification of tort doctrine, a multiplicity of midlevel 
principles, and detailed or well-defmed maximizing foundational theory. 
Instead, there is a more manageable demand that the midlevel principle of 
corrective justice reflect legal doctrine and that this midlevel principle inform 
and be, itself, informed by more abstract-and vague-ideas of fairness. 
Absent a demand that the midlevel principle of corrective justice be compatible 
with the foundational maximizing principles of distributive justice, consistency 
can be maintained. The present corrective justice model makes only a 
significantly weaker demand that the middle value of corrective justice be 
consistent with more abstract notions of fairness. The idea is that, in the first 
instance, there are practices and doctrines that are taken to embody the idea of 
corrective justice. These practices and doctrines provide concrete content to the 
more abstract aspects or requirements of the midlevel principle of corrective 
justice. The principle of corrective justice, in turn, gives content to our basic or 
foundational ideas of allocational "faimess."50 
47. Cf George P. Fletcher, Corrective Justice for Moderns, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1658, 1669 
(1993) (reviewing JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS ( 1992)) ("Corrective justice is not immanent 
in the tort system .... Nor does it provide a bulwark against economic and regulatory reasoning in tort 
law. [Further, i]t is not an absolute demand of justice and morality."). 
48. See Stephen R. Perry, Tort Law, in, A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY 57, 74 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) ("[C]orrective justice requires A to compensate B for loss 
caused by A's conduct ( ... by A'sfaulty conduct)."). 
49. See COLEMAN, supra note 23, at 54-55 ("[K]ey terms and concepts are made more 
concrete-their semantic content is more fully specified-by the social practices that articulate or 
embody them .... [T]he practices we have do not merely reveal the content of the principles to which 
we are committed; each practice partially constitutes that content . . . . Starting at so to speak, the 
ground level, we have practices of corrective justice--a system of practical inferences that purports to 
determine when the imposition of a liability is justified. The structure of these inferences in tort law 
gives determinate content to its key concepts, and thereby makes explicit the requirements of the 
principle of corrective justice; while at the same time the principle of corrective justice organizes the 
concepts of tort law, explains the nature and structure of the inferences those concepts license, and in 
doing so, guides the practice of tort law. The principle of corrective justice, in tum, occupies a mid-
level between the practices of tort law and an upper-level principle of fairness in allocating the cost of 
life's misfortunes. Here again the higher principle is said to be given determinate content by the 
practices subordinate to it, while at the same time guiding and constraining them."). 
50. COLEMAN, supra note 23, at 54-55. 
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This midlevel account remains consistent, but only at the cost of 
significantly constraining one's choice of foundational principles. These 
principles themselves are to be partially derived from the conception of 
"fairness" purportedly embodied in the backward-looking corrective justice 
account of tort. The demand for a holistic account prominently conflicts with 
the forward-looking and maximizing Rawlsian account of distributive justice. 
However fruitful this "holistic"51 multi-tiered corrective justice strategy may 
be, I am not confident that it will suit Merges's aim for unification. 
The trouble is this: the corrective justice midlevel strategy is less 
expansive than Merges's midlevel strategy and more constrained by tort 
doctrine. That is, the corrective justice strategy need not, and should not, seek 
to unify midlevel principles with maximizing, forward-looking foundational 
values. The corrective justice view ought to make no obvious or direct claim of 
the compatibility of midlevel principles with exogenous, maximizing 
foundational principles. 52 
Those holding well-defined foundational views should object to this 
corrective justice midlevel account. Consider the following: "to the libertarian 
(or to others)," the "obvious methodology for a normative theory of a body of 
law . . . reflect[ s] the assumption . . . that only such an independently 
determined norm could provide genuine normative guidance or constrain the 
practices of ... law from the standpoint of justice."53 The corrective justice 
midlevel strategy "naturally ... den[ies] that assumption,"54 but in doing so it 
makes no obvious claim of compatibility with exogenous and well-defined 
forward-looking maximizing foundational theories of distributive justice,55 as 
Merges does. 
But Merges's aim is to show compatibility between his midlevel 
principles and at least two highly specified and maximizing upper level 
accounts, Rawlsianism and utilitarianism. So, given Merges's desire for 
unification, the present corrective justice midlevel view of tort law may not 
serve well. Aside from the question of unification, there is still the question of 
51. /d. at 55. 
52. See John Rawls, The Basic Strncture as Subject, in JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LmERALISM 
266--67 (1993) [hereinafter PoLmCAL LmERALISM] ("[W]e cannot tell by looking only at the conduct 
of individuals and associations in the inunediate (or local) circumstances whether, from a social point 
of view, agreements [or transactions] reached are just or fair. For this assessment depends importantly 
on the features of the basic structure, on whether it succeeds in maintaining background justice."). 
53. COLEMAN, supra note 23, at 56. 
54. /d. 
55. !d. On the corrective justice midlevel account, contra the foundational principles Merges 
espouses, "no analytical priority is assigned ... to abstract concepts" (i.e., "concepts[s] regarded in 
abstraction from ... practices in which [they] figure[]; or a principle regarded in abstraction from ... 
the practices it purports to govern") whether they be "a lower mid-level one ... a higher mid-level one 
like ... corrective justice, or an upper-level concept like fairness ... or to the actual practices in which 
those concepts and practices figure." /d. & n.4 (emphasis added). 
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the existence of midlevel principles in the positive law of IP. I address this in 
the next section. 
B. Cases and Statutes: The Positive Law of IP and Mid/eve/ Principles 
The next obvious question is the extent to which IP law embodies 
Merges's midlevel principles. This Section addresses that question by looking 
at two prominent IP cases, eBay and Ethicon, and finds that Merges's midlevel 
principles are not reflected in IP doctrine. The absence of midlevel principles in 
important IP cases raises significant skepticism with regard to a conception of 
IP law which isolates such principles at the core of IP doctrine. 
For Merges, the principle of proportionality determines "when courts feel 
comfortable modifying the entitlement structure of already-issued IP rights to 
correct for undue leverage."56 If Merges is correct, courts will break-up an 
anti-commons by failing to enforce ownership rights where existing, previously 
granted entitlements create what Merges describes as "excessive" or 
"disproportionate" leverage.57 To be clear, the idea is this: where the 
relationship between the backward-looking value of desert (merit in ownership) 
is disproportionate to market leverage, the courts will fail to enforce an existing 
patent. 
Merges's claim is complex. His idea is first that in deciding whether or 
not to enforce a preexisting patent, the court will decide on backward-looking 
deontic grounds, as opposed to, say, utility-based grounds. And additionally, 
that the conception of fairness or justice the court actually invokes is his 
relationship of proportionality between merit and market leverage. 
It is crucial to Merges's view that midlevel principles regulate IP case 
outcomes. The above patent example, however, could conceivably be decided 
on various normative grounds. Thus, Merges must show that his articulated 
midlevel principles are the actual principles that control. Return to Merges's 
"inductive" account of the derivation of midlevel principles. Merges's approach 
involves first addressing legal doctrine (IP statutes and case law), and then, 
considering what these laws have in common. What he believes they have in 
common are his midlevel principles, which are supposedly capable of support 
under any foundational theory. 
Even if one grants Merges's inductive methodology, it is crucial that 
Merges shows that the substance of his midlevel principles underlies positive 
law. For example, that the midlevel principle of proportionality-is the 
principle that animates IP law's case outcomes. 
Before turning to the cases, it is important to review the role midlevel 
principles might play in the positive law. Were midlevel principles to exist and 
to count as rigorously embodied in the settled positive law, they would need to 
56. MERGES, supra note 2, at 181. 
57. !d. at 182. 
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be reasonably clear and definite. Further, they would need to be uniform 
enough to guide or control judicial decisions. 
But consider the deontic notion of proportionality: in order to evaluate the 
proportionality of the relationship between market leverage and contribution, 
one must first establish the degree of desert an inventor possesses for his art. 
Desert, however, is a difficult concept to define, let alone use as the basis of 
ownership in a complex market system. Further, such appraisals may be 
difficult to separate from marginal product, which, in turn, is not suitably 
distinct from the values on the economic side of the proportion to make an 
evaluation of the "fairness" of the proportionality. One is now in a good 
position to reflect upon eBay and Ethicon. 
I. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.58 
Merges discusses his view in terms of what he conceives of as an instance 
of "disproportionate leverag[ing]"59 in the widely discussed eBay IP case.60 
Here, Merges holds that his principle of proportionality (that is, the relationship 
between the backward-looking notion of desert and market leverage) may be 
understood as the nonnative ground behind the Court's failure to uphold a 
previously granted patent. In crafting his argument, however, Merges focuses 
not on the unanimous majority opinion which did not discuss proportionality, 
but rather on Justice Kennedy's concurrence, which garnered the support of 
only three other justices. As Merges's views purport to be straightforwardly 
engaged with the positive law of IP, it is instructive to revisit both the 
unanimous majority opinion and Justice Kennedy's concurrence in the eBay 
case. 
Consider the values of the case in light of Merges's view. MercExchange 
holds a patent for an "electronic market" that facilitates transactions, which it 
endeavored to license to eBay and Half.com, but the parties failed to reach an 
agreement.61 MercExchange then sued eBay for patent-infringement.62 The 
district court found that MercExchange's patent was valid and was infringed by 
eBay, awarding merely monetary damages and expressly declining to award 
permanent injunctive relief.63 That is, the court awarded liability rule 
protection, as opposed to property rule, protection.64 MercExchange then 
58. 547 u.s. 388 (2006). 
59. MERGES, supra note 2, at 161 (disproportionate leveraging occurs when ownership rights 
are out of balance with the market leverage the right holder possesses). 
60. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 388. 
61. /d. at 390. 
62. /d. 
63. !d. at 390-91. 
64. See Guido Calabresi & A Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1105-06 (1972) (explaining the 
difference between liability and property rules). 
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appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.65 The 
circuit court granted MercExchange a permanent injunction (property rule 
protection), reasoning that in the absence of exceptional circumstances, it had 
never failed to enjoin patent infringement.66 eBay then appealed to the Supreme 
Court to determine whether a permanent injunction is required when a patent 
has been violated.67 The unanimous majority vacated and remanded68 the 
decision of the Federal Circuit, finding that both lower courts failed to apply a 
"four factor test"69 required in determining the appropriateness of granting 
permanent injunctive relief under the U.S. Patent Act.70 
The Federal Circuit held that section 154 of the Patent Act did justify such 
a per se rule. 71 The Supreme Court rejected this argument and refused "to 
replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction 
automatically follows a determination ... [of] infringe[ment]."72 While there is 
no statutory per se rule, courts have the right to grant injunctive relief only if 
the four-factor test is satisfied.73 
The district court concluded that a '"plaintiffs willingness to license its 
patents' and 'its lack of commercial activity in practicing the patents' would be 
sufficient to establish that the patent holder would not suffer irreparable harm if 
an injunction did not issue."74 Interestingly, however, the majority took no 
position on whether a permanent injunction should be granted. 75 Instead, it 
65. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. 
66. /d. 
67. /d. 
68. /d. at 394. 
69. /d. at 391 ("According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a 
permanent injunction ... must demonstrate: (l) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that 
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; 
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is 
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction."). 
Interestingly, there still is a lack of convincing evidence in the four-prong test demonstrating that 
Merges's specified principle of proportionality is operative. 
70. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012). Section 283 of the Patent Act states, "The several courts having 
jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity 
to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable." 
/d. (emphasis added). 
71. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391; 35 U.S.C. § l54(a)(l) (2012) ("Every patent shall contain a short 
title of the invention and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others 
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or 
importing the invention into the United States, and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude 
others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United States, or importing into the 
United States, products made by that process, referring to the specification for the particulars 
thereof."). 
72. eBay, 547 U.S. at 392-93. 
73. /d. at 392. 
74. /d. at 393 (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E.D. 
Va. 2003)). 
75. /d. at 394. 
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vacated the decision and remanded the case for application of the four-factor 
framework.76 
Return to Merges. As I say, he fmds fertile ground in support of his 
midlevel principles not in the majority opinion, but in Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence. This concurrence, however, marshals the support of only three 
other justices. Kennedy argues that granting injunctions to patentees may need 
to be assessed in light of licensing fees and the public interest.77 Justice 
Kennedy is aptly concerned about patent trolls and increasing market prices 
due to market leverage and the ability to hold out over negotiating parties.78 At 
the same time, the unanimous opinion's reasoning for reversal is the Federal 
Circuit's misapplication of the "traditional four-factor framework that governs 
the award of injunctive relief."79 To be clear, the opinion of the court expressly 
declines to consider whether a permanent injunction would be proper in this 
case. 
80 But Merges does not read eBay in this manner. Instead, in his reading of 
eBay, 
[t]he Supreme Court takes the position that it may in proper cases look 
behind the leverage created by a property right. This inquiry ... 
reveals the heart of the proportionality principle .... The contribution 
of the property owner is weighed against the economic leverage the 
right provides in actual market transactions.81 
Since desert and market leverage lack what Merges conceives of as 
"balance," one would predict that the Court would step in as proportionality 
might require. 82 Here, again, what Merges must have in mind is that the Court 
intervenes for the backward-looking reasons of his midlevel principle of 
proportionality; that is, the particular relationship between owner desert and 
market leverage. 
But, there is no clear evidence of Merges's desert-based notion of 
proportionality in the opinion of the case, nor in Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence, which Merges cites enthusiastically. Further, mere overlap of the 
Court's majority opinion or the concurrence with the would-be outcome of the 
application of Merges's principle of proportionality is insufficient to show that 
his principle is constitutive of the positive law. The concurrence simply holds 
76. Id. 
77. ld. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
78. ld. ("For these firms, an injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its 
violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy 
licenses to practice the patent. . . . When the patented invention is but a small component of the 
product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue 
leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and 
an injunction may not serve the public interest.") (citations omitted). 
79. ld. at 394. 
80. ld. 
81. MERGES, supra note 2, at 167. 
82. ld. 
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that the Supreme Court of the United States should disallow the market 
leverage associated with a counterproductive holdout. 
Kennedy does not reference the ideas embodied in Merges's highly 
stylized understanding of proportionality between the deontic notion of desert 
and market leverage. Instead, Justice Kennedy balances what he describes as 
"undue leverage" with a patented "small component."83 The mere discussion of 
a trade-off or "balancing" is insufficient to demonstrate that Justice Kennedy is 
invoking Merges's principle of proportionality. Importantly, alternative 
principles would serve equally well as the basis of Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence. So, foundational principles, say, the utility principle or Rawls's 
forward-looking principles of justice,84 would also demand breaking up 
inefficient holdouts, but at the level of theory, would rule out the desert-based 
conception of fairness embedded in Merges's principle ofproportionality.85 
There is an absence of convincing evidence for Merges's rnidlevel 
position in the eBay case. Yet Merges's thinking is rich and the midlevel 
tradition from which it is drawn is important. Thus, it is crucial to test his 
claims against additional IP doctrine. 
2. Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp. 
I tum now to an IP inventor and ownership case which straightforwardly 
rejects Merges's midlevel strategy. Consider Ethicon, Inc. v. United States 
Surgical Corp. 86 with an eye toward Merges's midlevel principles-
specifically his critically important principle of proportionality. Here, the 
Federal Circuit considered the question, among others, of whether a minor 
joint-contributor87 to the inventive process is entitled to what would be, for 
Merges, disproportionate ownership and licensing rights to an entire patent, or 
whether the terms of a patent license agreement are limited to the components 
of an invention to which each individual inventor contributed, as Merges's 
proportionality principle would dictate.88 Interestingly, the majority held, 
contra Merges's proportionality principle, that a contribution to one claim of 
the patent is sufficient to establish full ownership rights in the entire patent.89 
83. eBay, 547 U.S. at 396. 
84. See Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern 
Information?, 85 TEX. L. REv. 783 (2007); see also Smith, supra note 2, at 1781 ("It is ultimately an 
empirical question at what point the uncertainty in the contours of intellectual property rights leads to 
serious enough holdout problems to justifY a move away from injunctions (property rules) toward 
damages (liability rules)."). 
85. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998). 
86. Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456 (Fed Cir. 1998). 
87. One who has made a comparatively small contribution to the inventive process. 
88. See generally Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 146~7 (finding that joint inventions may become 
joint property without express agreement to the contrary; therefore, Y oon must share ownership of all 
claims with Choi, the minor joint-contributor, including those claims that he invented by himself). 
89. !d. at 1460. 
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In Ethicon, Y oon, a physician-inventor, worked with Choi, an electronic 
technician, and created a safety device for a medical and surgical instrument 
called a "trocar."90 After ending his relationship with Choi, Yoon applied for a 
patent disclosing various embodiments of a safety trocar, naming himself the 
sole inventor. The United States Patent and Trademark Office then issued the 
patent ('"773 patent") to Yoon with 55 claims.91 
Y oon then granted an exclusive license to Ethicon, but failed to disclose 
his application or its issuance to Choi.92 Ethicon then sued U.S. Surgical 
Corporation for a purported infringement of two claims under the '773 patent.93 
With this suit pending, U.S. Surgical learned of Choi's involvement in the 
creation of the safety trocar and obtained a "retroactive license" from Choi, 
which allowed it to use Choi's trocar-related inventions.94 Choi agreed to assist 
U.S. Surgical in any lawsuit related to the '773 patent.95 U.S. Surgical 
motioned to correct inventorship of the '773 patent, maintaining that Choi was 
a co-inventor of various claims under the patent.96 
The district court ruled in favor of U.S. Surgical, fmding that Choi was a 
co-owner of the '773 patent as he contributed to two claims under the patent.97 
U.S. Surgical then motioned to dismiss, arguing that because Choi was a co-
owner of the patent, and since he had granted U.S. Surgical a retroactive 
license, there was no patent infringement. 98 The district court again ruled in 
favor of U.S. Surgical, and granted the motion to dismiss.99 
On appeal Ethicon argued, in keeping with Merges, that Choi was only 
entitled to those claims to which he had contributed and not to the entire 
patent. 100 The circuit court was unimpressed: it noted that the Patent Act makes 
clear that each co-inventor shares an undivided interest in a patent regardless of 
whether he or she "make[ s] a contribution to the subject matter of every claim 
of the patent."101 Further, section 262 of the Patent Act speaks of ownership in 
terms of a patent, not ownership in terms of claims under the patent. 102 
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court, holding that a joint 
inventor, for example, even a relatively minor contributor to the overall 
invention, could effectively prevent his joint inventor from enforcing the patent 








98. /d. at 1459-60. 
99. /d. at 1460. 
100. /d. 
101. 35 U.S.C. § ll6(a)(2012). 
102. 35 U.S.C. § 262 (2012); see also Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1466. 
1334 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:1315 
against an alleged infringement. 103 Contra Merges, co-inventors share an 
undivided interest in the entire patent, regardless oftheir contributions. 104 Thus, 
a co-inventor need not contribute to every claim within the patent to enjoy full 
ownership rights of the entirety. 105 Proportionality need not obtain. 
The theoretical issues at stake, however, are plainly controversial. 106 The 
dissenting opinion describes the history of the law of joint invention and 
ownership and its attendant conception of fairness, equality, and 
proportionality. 107 Prior to Ethicon, a 1984 amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 116 had 
broadened the eligibility for joint inventorship to include any person who 
makes an inventive contribution to a least one claim of a patent. 108 Previously, 
only those inventors making contributions to each claim under a patent would 
achieve full and undivided ownership in the entire patent. 109 Drawing on this 
legislative history, the dissent asserted that "the law of shared ownership was 
founded on shared invention."110 
Before 1984, joint ownership "required mutuality of interaction and a real 
partnership in the creation and development of the invention."111 A "joint 
inventor"' was 'justly and legally, an equal owner of the idea and of any patent 
thereon."112 This previous conception no longer holds given changes in joint 
inventorship doctrine. 113 The dissent invoked. notions akin to Merges's free-
floating principle of proportionality and dignity, holding, that the 1984 
amendment unfairly rewards those who do not contribute. It stated: "the 
legislators surely did not intend to create [an] inequity"114 and "[i]t is not an 
implementation of the common law of property, or its statutory embodiments, 
103. Ethicon, 153 F.3d at 1466 (interpreting section 262 of the Patent Act to confer in a joint 
inventor the presumption of ownership in the entire patent). 
104. This conflicts with Merges's conception of proportionality and his related backward-
looking midlevel principle of dignity. 
105. Ethicon, 153 F.3d at 1460 (citing SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 
859 F.2d 878, 888 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
106. "In Ethicon, the court's decision, while jurisprudentially correct, risks causing potential 
inequities among disproportionately vested joint inventors as well as a general erosion of the social 
policy against patent infringement" Dale L. Carlson & James R Barney, The Division of Rights 
Among Joint Inventors: Public Policy Concerns After Ethicon v. U.S. Surgical, 39 IDEA 251, 266 
(1999). 
107. Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1470--71 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
108. 35 U.S.C. § 116(a) (2012) ("When an invention is made by two or more persons jointly, 
they shall apply for patent jointly and each make the required oath, except as otherwise provided in this 
title. Inventors may apply for a patent jointly even though (1) they did not physically work together or 
at the same time, (2) each did not make the same type or amount of contribution, or (3) each did not 
make a contribution to the subject matter of every claim of the patent.") (emphasis added). 
109. Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1469 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("Before the statutory change made 
in 1984 Mr. Choi could not have been named a 'joint inventor' of the '773 patent, for he had not 
jointly conceived and contributed to the entire invention."). 
110. Id. at 1472. 
Ill. Id. at 1470. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 1469; see also 35 U.S.C. § 116(a) (2012). 
114. Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1471. 
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to treat all persons, however minor their contribution, as full owners of the 
entire property as a matter oflaw."ll5 
Further, "[t]he law had never given a contributor to a minor portion of an 
invention a full share in the originator's patent."116 However, this thinking was 
based on an "all claims" doctrine of joint inventorship that has been 
repudiated. 117 Under the new law, one might even object that the "rule that 
grants equal and undivided interests to joint inventors, regardless of their 
respective inventive contributions to the individual claims of the patent, is both 
illogical and inequitable."118 
C. Mid/eve/ Analysis in Light of eBay and Ethicon 
Return now to Merges and the account of midlevel principles. There is 
theoretical controversy in the common law represented by the sharply differing 
majority and dissenting opinions in Ethicon. 119 First, while the midlevel 
principles Merges articulates-specifically the principle of proportionality-
may at various times guide some IP statutes and the structure of some courts' 
reasoning, like the dissent in Ethicon, the principle is not embedded, in any 
rigorous or uniform fashion, in Ethicon or eBay. In Ethicon, the majority 
explicitly rejected any account of proportionality between inventor and the 
backward notion of contribution and ownership rights as being legally 
salient. 120 Instead, the Federal Circuit appears to have adopted a more 
pragmatic approach to the joint-invention-and-joint-ownership quandary for 
reasons of mere simplicity and practically. 
Again, as in eBay, there is no legally binding mention of the relationship 
between ownership rights derived from the backward-looking value of desert 
and the market power derived from ownership or the right to exclude. My sense 
is that, given the need for simplicity and practicality, the principle of 
proportionality is too indefmite to fulfill the prominent role Merges asks of it. 
And correspondingly, the principle does not rigorously lie behind the positive 
law of IP, but it instead-as one might expect of a philosophical principle-
represents one highly stylized dimension of a critically important normative 
debate whose partisans at various times get a hearing in the positive law of IP. 
Merges's principle of proportionality may better serve as a normative 




117. !d. at 1469; see also 35 U.S.C. § 116(a) (2012). 
118. Carlson & Barney, supra note 106, at 256. 
119. See generally Ethicon, 135 F.3d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
120. See id. at 1466 ("[A] joint inventor as to even one claim enjoys a presumption of 
ownership in the entire patent."). 
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III. 
FOUNDATIONS AND MIDLEVEL PRINCIPLES 
This Part first describes what I take to be the proper relationship between 
foundational values and would-be midlevel principles. It then articulates a 
fundamental incompatibility between maximizing foundational principles and 
backward-looking midlevel principles. This conflict holds for such midlevel 
principles, whether in the context of Merges's backward-looking principle of 
proportionality or the corrective justice conception of tort. This Part also holds 
that this prominent conflict cannot be overcome by appeal to pluralism or 
agreement drawn from an overlapping political consensus. 
At the outset, a quick recap of a plausible account of the relationship 
between foundational values and midlevel principles may be helpful. Midlevel 
principles, if they exist, are normative principles that regulate actual legal 
institutions and their decision making. Such values control and regulate 
political and legal institutions. Institutional decisions are made on the basis of 
such midlevel values, without direct appeal to foundations. 
Foundational values, by contrast, are broad normative principles of 
general or comprehensive application. In a legal and political system actually 
constrained by midlevel principles, the institutions operating on these principles 
must satisfy the deeper foundations; that is, where the fundamental principles 
are utilitarian, the whole set of institutions will serve to maximize utility 
compared with alternative institutions; were the foundational principles 
Rawlsian, the institutions as a whole would need to satisfy Rawls's two 
principles of justice. In this sense, foundational principles would be expected to 
control or regulate midlevel principles. 
This, however, is not Merges's view. While Merges takes great care in 
addressing and articulating foundational political theory, and his accounts of 
Locke, Kant, and Rawls are sophisticated, the role of foundations in Merges's 
account of IP is unclear. Merges must hold that foundational theory is, in some 
manner, critical to IP law; but in his view, midlevel principles are the 
controlling norms of IP. These "midlevel" principles, which "spring from 
doctrine and detail, from the grain of actual practice[,] ... do not depend upon 
any particular set of [fundamental] values for their validity."121 
Merges does not allow for his midlevel principles to be trumped, 
governed, or constrained by foundations. He propounds an "independence 
of ... foundational normative principles from the operational details of [IP 
law], as well as from the midlevel principles that arise from and are shaped by 
those [operational] details."122 Foundational values occupy "the top of this 
hierarchy." "What lies beyond [midlevel] principles ... is a set of 'upper-level' 
121. MERGES, supra note 2, at 140. 
122. /d. 
2013] IP DOCTRINE AND MIDLEVEL PRINCIPLES 1337 
principles, which correspond roughly to deep or foundational ... values."123 
But this approach is a counter-intuitive midlevel strategy, particularly when 
paired with Merges's aim at unification in IP. It would be more straightforward 
to understand "midlevel" principles, as described above, as constrained by or 
even constructed in service to foundational values. 
To be fair to Merges's position, views akin to his exist in the corrective 
justice account of tort. Stephen Perry, for example, has suggested that the 
internal workings of Rawlsian theory are compatible with a corrective justice 
conception of tort law. Perry holds that since Rawlsianism is "highly 
indeterminate,"124 the actual scheme of legal and political institutions created 
by the principles of justice can accommodate the corrective justice conception 
of tort law. 125 
Perry attributes the possibility of this compatibility to the "dynamic," as 
opposed to "static" nature of Rawlsianism. 126 But, the distinction is difficult to 
articulate: there is little reason to believe, as Perry does, that static Lockean 
principles should be thought of as fixing one scheme in place or that dynamic 
Rawlsianism permits constantly changing schemes. Both types of principles 
impose specified structural economic demands: Rawlsianism and Lockeanism 
are as static or as dynamic as the principles and the empirical circumstances 
demand. 
Since the Rawlsian principles of justice are maximizing, there is little 
indeterminacy in the selection of the complete scheme of legal and political 
institutions, as Perry maintains. 127 The selected scheme is constructed to 
maximize the position of the least well-off, while satisfying the maximizing 
requirements of the first principle of justice and the opportunity principle, taken 
in that order. 128 A scheme of legal and political institutions that includes the 
backward-looking corrective justice model of tort law, at the level of principle, 
conflicts with the demands of the two principles of distributive justice-when 
compared to all other possible schemes. Merges's midlevel account of IP is 
b. 0 "l fl" 129 su ~ect to a simi ar con 1ct. 
123. !d. 
124. Stephen R. Perry, On the Relationship Between Corrective and Distributive Justice, in 
OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 237, 260 (Jeremy Horder ed., 4th ed. 2000). 
125. !d. at 247 ("[C]orrective justice should be conceived of as an independent moral principle 
that operates within the context of distributive justice, but not as a part of it."). 
126. /d.at246-47. 
127. See Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, On Belling the Cat: Rawls and Tort as 
Corrective Justice, 92 VA. L. REv. 1279, 1307 (2006). 
128. See id. at 1306 ("[R]awlsianism and a principled commitment to corrective justice are 
incompatible. If more than one institutional scheme satisfies the adequacy demand of the (revised) first 
principle of justice, then the opportunity principle and the difference principle, taken in lexical priority, 
are free to select between them."). 
129. !d. ("[S]ince the [Rawlsian] difference principle is maximizing, it will be incompatible 
with economic arrangements derived from backward-looking moral concerns such as the corrective 
justice conception of tort."). 
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A. Pluralism 
This Section further addresses the conflict between independent midlevel 
principles and maximizing foundational principles. It addresses the idea that 
this conceptual conflict may be overcome though appeal to pluralism or a 
political consensus, concluding that a unification strategy drawn from 
pluralistic arguments cannot be sustained. 
Return briefly to Merges. He holds that there is, at once, the possibility of 
compatibility among the foundational theories of Kant, Locke, and Rawls, and 
Merges's own avowed midlevel values. Merges holds that foundations engage 
midlevel principles and are critical to IP Jaw. It is unclear given his position 
how such foundational principles are capable of exerting a governing constraint 
upon his midlevel principles. It remains an open question how foundational 
conceptions of property mediated by mid! eve! values might inform or engage 
IP law's doctrine, much less, constrain or govern it. 
Merges appears well aware of this concern and boldly addresses the issue 
head-on. He asks, "[ w ]hat would it do to ... the field [of IP Jaw] if the deep 
substratum could be changed under our feet ... ?"130 He answers, "[A]t the 
operational level ... not much .... [T]he ... operational principles of the IP 
system are the midlevel principles . . . . Efficiency, Nonremoval, 
Proportionality and Dignity-these basic principles ... are largely independent 
of the deep conceptual justifications of IP protection."131 He continues, noting 
that in his view "[foundations] rarely do much direct work, or make a large 
practical difference, to the IP system in its day-to-day operation"132 Merges 
then addresses foundations directly: "What about at the theoretical level? What 
would it do to our understanding of the field if we shifted from one foundation 
to another?"133 The answer to this question is critical to understanding 
Merges's view: "My theory of IP includes this foundational pluralism .... In 
the vast majority of cases, the new normative grounding does not affect my 
view of correct policy in any way."134 These remarks are both highly 
provocative and suggestive. At first read, one wonders if Merges has in mind 
the skeptical idea that we just do not know enough to adequately apply 
foundational principles; or perhaps the legal realist idea that Jaw is ultimately 
indeterminate. But, neither of these is his position. 
On one hand, it can, at times, be difficult to determine or know with 
confidence whether or not actual institutional rules are doing their part in 
satisfying foundational principles. Nevertheless, complete skepticism in this 
regard is not warranted, nor is it espoused by Merges; we often have very good 
ideas of how to improve our institutions in respect of one or another opposing 
130. MERGES, supra note 2, at 9. 
131. /d. 
132. /d. (emphasis added). 
133. !d. 
134. /d. at 10-11 (emphasis added). 
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fundamental principle. On the other hand, what Merges may have in mind is a 
perfectly sound insight: Our confidence in our knowledge of when institutions 
are meeting the demands of foundational principles may be best in cases where 
it matters very little whether we are to improve the position of the least well-off 
or increase the maximum number of satisfactions, since the most obvious 
improvements to IP institutions or rights will do both. 
Yet Merges's view is significantly stronger than the assertion of this 
sound insight-he aims to defend more than the content of these remarks. 
Merges is arguing for the principled compatibility of foundational and midlevel 
principles. 135 However, his strategy aims to achieve such compatibility at the 
cost of breaking the conceptual link between midlevel and foundational 
principles. For Merges, at the level of IP law's doctrine, midlevel principles 
hold primacy over foundational principles; for Merges, there is "room at the 
bottom"136 for a full range of foundational theories. 137 He argues that various 
foundations "serve equally well to anchor the principles and practices of IP 
law."138 
Recall that Merges's goal is to unify "social practices and institutions; 
midlevel principles, such as efficiency and proportionality; and the 
foundational concepts of Locke, Kant, and Rawls, in a single coherent theory of 
the IP field." 139 Merges believes these foundational concepts "best justify the 
structure of IP law."140 He argues further in this compatibilist vein that "other 
foundations might serve as well .... [T]here is 'room at the bottom,' at the 
foundational level of the field, for various justificatory principles, including 
perhaps utilitarianism and various alternative ethical theories." 141 
So, Merges is clearly no skeptic, and these last remarks indicate that he 
does not hold that legal theory is indeterminate. Instead, it would appear that 
Merges defends an inviting systematic account of pluralism-bold in its 
ambition and inspired, in no small measure, by the Rawlsian ideal of political 
agreement. 142 I turn to these ideas next. 
Merges's idea is that appeals to foundations are essentially irrelevant to 
resolving IP questions. For Merges, courts may resolve actual legal 
controversies in IP law-between partisans to foundational disputes-by 
invoking midlevel principles. Merges's hope is that such partisans, regardless 
135. !d. at 13. 
136. /d. at 140. 
137. /d. 
138. !d. 
139. /d. at 13. 
140. /d. at 140. 
141. /d. at 140, 7-11. This is a strong claim-in stating that there is room at the foundational 
level, Merges would appear, at least in sentiment, to be calling into question the determinacy of the 
conflicting political theories he has introduced. 
142. POLmCAL LIBERALISM, supra note 52, at 134 (describing an overlapping consensus as a 
"social unity based on a consensus" even among those who hold differing foundational values or 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines). 
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of foundational commitment, in fact, accept the same midlevel principles of IP. 
Here, the midlevel argument draws heavily upon the Rawlsian account of 
pluralism. 143 Locating Merges's argument in this context may be helpful. 
Rawls initially presented his account of "Justice as Fairness" in A Theory 
if l . 144 h . I . 145 H h I b o .~ustzce as a compre enstve mora vtew. owever, e ater came to e 
impressed with what he calls the "fact of reasonable pluralism,"146 the idea that 
a diversity of foundational values is a permanent feature of democratic 
society. 147 Like Merges's account, this is not foundational skepticism: Rawls 
did not deny that one might know a specific comprehensive view to be correct, 
nor did he deny that others are mistaken in their foundational beliefs. 148 Rawls 
did deny, though, that there were any reliable and morally acceptable methods 
that could persuade all reasonable and rational people to agree on foundational 
principles and, further, that this type of disagreement is an inevitable feature of 
free or liberal society. 149 But this form of reasonable pluralism poses a serious 
problem to anyone who aspires to a society in which every reasonable person 
can accept the basic principles of the society: its law. So Rawls, in Political 
Liberalism, 150 came to hold the view-perhaps naively so-that his account of 
justice could appeal to a wide range of reasonable, comprehensive (in Merges's 
language, foundational) views and be the object of an "overlapping 
consensus." 151 
There is a significant tension in this posttlon, one that is even 
foreshadowed in A Theory of Justice. That is, the tension between the emphasis 
Rawls places on "toleration"152-which later comes to serve as a model for the 
type oftheory Political Liberalism defends-and the status of his initial view in 
A Theory of Justice as, itself, a comprehensive view .153 This is a tension, too, 
that any midlevel view in IP law must address. A mere appeal to the empirical 
possibility of an overlapping consensus is insufficient to demonstrate the 
143. MERGES, supra note 2, at 141 ("My version ... derives ... from John Rawls's 
conception of pluralism .... For Rawls, 'public reason' plays much the same role as midlevel 
principles do in my approach to IP. [Rawls] calls the shared deliberative space ... an 'overlapping 
consensus,' and this is . . . the spirit of what I am describing . . . . Midlevel principles create an 
overlapping consensus among people with differing beliefs about the ultimate normative foundations 
of IP law .... They bracket, and ... transcend, disagreements about ultimate issues, while tying 
together disparate strands of doctrine and practice."). 
144. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 3, 30. 
145. !d. at 19. That is, a foundational normative theory of general application; which 
incorporates basic, non-range-limited normative principles. 
146. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 32 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) 
[hereinafter JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS). 
147. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 52, at 36. 
148. JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 146, at 90. 
149. !d. 
150. POLffiCAL LIBERALISM, supra note 52. 
151. JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 146, at 190. 
152. !d. at 192-93. 
153. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 3, 19, 30. 
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principled compatibility of a midlevel account of the private law with 
foundations. 
A Theory of Justice was written largely in an attempt to displace 
utilitarianism by correcting for canonical objections to it. 154 These objections 
highlighted that utilitarianism embodied a distributive problem, namely, that it 
failed to take seriously what Rawls understood as the moral distinction between 
persons. 155 Accordingly, it is not clear that there is the possibility of any 
overlapping consensus, since Rawls's two principles of justice, and 
utilitarianism, for example, straightforwardly conflict. There is always a 
possibility of a range of contingent (non-principled) overlap, and concerns over 
the rule of law or political stability may bring about compromise among 
proponents of differing foundational principles. However, this form of 
agreement or compromise is insufficient to serve Merges's principled 
unification project. 
First, the domain of any such contingent overlap is uncertain. And second, 
Merges's claim that his midlevel principles of IP are dominant in any 
overlapping consensus appears simply utopian: his principles conflict with both 
Rawlsianism and utilitarianism and are not, as we have seen, systematically 
present in the positive law. A claim of contingent overlap should provide pause 
for concern, as does the question of the justificatory force of any such overlap. 
B. Conflicting Conceptions of Liberalism and Property Theory 
This Section discusses competing conceptions of liberalism. In doing so, 
the Section elaborates upon the prominent conflict between maximizing 
foundational conceptions of liberalism and backward-looking principles. The 
Section holds that several important aspects of Rawlsianism, crucial and 
powerful as they are, often go unappreciated. Once fully acknowledged, they 
demonstrate the incompatibility between Merges's midlevel principles and the 
Rawlsianism conception of distributive justice. Importantly, this 
incompatibility does not show or suggest that Merges's midlevel principles are 
defective or unacceptable in their own right. Instead, the Section casts doubt 
upon Merges's ambition of unification in IP and suggests that his midlevel 
account might be best understood as an appealing alternative to Rawlsianism, 
rather than being understood as consistent with it. 
Consider foundational principles again. There is theoretical tension 
between the foundations Merges espouses. Although each theory provides a 
liberal account of property, they each also offer competing and conceivably 
conflicting conceptions of property. Merges recognizes that these liberal 
theories, despite any possible range of contingent overlap, may conflict. "[F]or 
me," he writes, "a lock-solid utilitarian case might someday unseat 
154. !d. at94--97. 
155. !d. 
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deontological rights as the [IP] field's foundation." 156 Despite this 
acknowledgement, Merges's foundational property principles must ultimately 
serve a more definitive role in IP than his position seemingly allows. I elaborate 
in what follows by considering competing conceptions of liberalism. 
1. Pre- and Post-Political Values 
Merges accepts an important distinction among political theories: the 
broad distinction between pre- 157 and post-institutional conceptions of 
liberalism. 158 For pre-institutionalists, economic concepts, including aspects of 
IP, serve as the normative basis of institutional economic rights. 159 Here, 
backward-looking, pre-political notions of economic desert, merit, or moral 
responsibility and their corresponding notions of natural economic rights are 
primary. 
For post-institutionalists on the other hand, legal and political institutions 
serve overarching distributive principles that define details of economic rights 
and entitlement. 160 Here, pre-political morality is silent with regard to economic 
constructions. 161 It would appear, then, that Merges's midlevel principle of 
proportionality invokes, in some measure, the pre-institutional conception of 
desert and balances this value with market leverage. Yet there is an open 
question how such a pre-institutional principle of proportionality fares in the 
context of the Rawlsian post-institutional construction. 
2. Post-Institutional Maximizing Foundations 
Merges insightfully and correctly recognizes two further important aspects 
of Rawlsianism: first, that the two principles of justice, although derived from 
the original position, are, in some measure, maximizing162 and 
consequentialist; 163 and second, that these principles define Rawls's account of 
justice in legal and political institutions. Merges's acceptance of the distinction 
156. MERGES, supra note 2, at 10. 
157. !d. at 35 ("[O]n the basis ofthisprepolitical [property] right to individual appropriation, 
people come together to form governments.") (emphasis added). 
158. /d. at 95 (acknowledging the post-institutional conception of property and intellectual 
property rights) ("[Property rights] are not really conceivable without a state, so they cannot in any 
sense precede the state, at least not in their final, mature form."). 
159. See ROBERT NOZlCK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 150 (1974); A. JOHN SIMMONS, 
THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 222 ( 1992). 
160. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 10,311,314. 
161. /d. at 17-22. 
162. MERGES, supra note 2, at 104 ("Rawls's specific formulation [of the economic 
component of the second principle of justice] is often described as the "maximin" principle (short for 
maximizing the minimum): inequalities are tolerated only insofar as they maximize the minimum level 
of support in a society, that is, the support of the least advantaged") (emphasis added). 
163. !d. (''[Rawls's] system of thought begins with a Kantian focus on the rights of each 
individual, but then integrates this with an emphasis on the ... distribution of resources.") (emphasis 
added). 
2013] IP DOCTRINE AND MIDLEVEL PRINCIPLES 1343 
between pre- and post-institutionalism, conjoined with his apt recognition of 
these important aspects of Rawlsianism, is instructive in highlighting the 
present conflict. 
Rawls's two ordered principles of justice reflect the plurality of values 
and deontological commitments of the original position. However, moving 
forward from the original position, the principles of justice are consequentialist, 
maximizing, and forward-looking in their selection among competing complete 
schemes oflegal and political institutions. 
The two principles of justice evaluate the distributive outcomes of 
competing complete legal and political schemes in terms of the expected 
quality of life of citizens living under such schemes, measured by what Rawls 
describes as an objective index of primary goods. 164 The principles, in their 
application or function, are indifferent to all backward-looking moral 
concems.
165 Such deontic considerations are either endogenous to the principles 
themselves or have been abandoned in the original position as arbitrary from 
the moral point of view. Once the two principles of justice are derived, any 
remaining commitment to pre-institutional notions of economic desert is 
irrelevant. Conceptions of justice or economic desert, including would-be 
expansive IP rights, are then defined post-institutionally by the rules of legal 
and political institutions. So, Rawls's principles of justice are consequentialist, 
despite Rawls's clear initial Kantian starting point. 
3. The Incompatibility 
Return now to my second point above: Rawlsian principles provide a 
definitive account of economic justice, specifically, the details of ownership 
and entitlement.166 The trouble for Merges is this: in his view, IP doctrine is 
164. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 92-95; JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 146, at 
61-65. 
165. See Thomas W. Pogge, Three Problems with Contractarian-Consequentialist Ways of 
Assessing Social Institutions, 12 Soc. PHIL. & POL 'y 241, 244 ( 1995). 
166. Although Merges and I appear, at points, to be in agreement with regard to this matter, it 
remains unclear how Merges reconciles his thoughts with his midlevel principles ofiP. The difference 
principle is the second of two ordered principles, further constrained by the opportunity principle. So, 
arguably considerations other than economic distribution are at stake in IP matters. That is, one might 
argue on the basis of Rawls's first principle of justice that IP law, say, makers' or creators' rights, 
would have some independence of economic distributive considerations. Consistent with Merges, my 
response is this: for Rawls, all economic-oriented property baselines are a second principle matter. 
Rawls, as Merges eloquently discusses, does allow that the first principle constructs what Rawls calls 
"personal property." Merges acknowledges a point I have argued elsewhere, although in the context of 
contract and tort: that the first principle of justice may require that some very basic property rights may 
be required. See Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Rawls and Contract Law, 73 GEO. 
WASH. L. REv. 598 (2005). The point, however, is that broader specific details of the rights of 
ownership require a property baseline that is not available at the first principle level. Thus, for Rawls, 
the law of IP is chiefly a second principle matter. See id. (describing personal property, contract 
options and articulating the ''high-Rawlsian" position with regard to property and economic 
constructions); see also MERGES, supra note 2, at 102-03 ("[T]he starting point for [Rawls'] 
discussion is not fairness within the institution of property, but the fairness of property itself, 
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under the exclusive regulatory or normative control of midlevel principles. But 
one who demands this exclusive control cannot avoid a conflict, at the level of 
principle, between Rawls's two principles of justice and Merges's midlevel 
principles of IP. Merges's account of IP cannot avoid the relentless nature of 
the maximizing aspects of the two principles of justice any more than tax law 
can. Absent any coherent reason for the normative priority of midlevel 
principles over foundations, conflict is inescapable, particularly if, as is true 
here, the foundational principles are maximizing. 
These important features of Rawlsianism, which Merges himself 
embraces, render the selected complete scheme of legal and political rules 
incompatible with independent conceptions of justice or fairness grounded in 
alternative, backward-looking notions of desert. Rawlsianism is incompatible 
with the independent midlevel account of IP law Merges defends. 167 
Merges might, instead, offer his midlevel position as a more intuitive 
alternative to a Rawlsian account of IP law. Since Rawls appears to stand in 
contrast to Merges, Merges's position may more effectively be introduced or 
understood as embodying a critique of Rawlsianism. 
But still, Merges has important insights about Rawls and IP law. He 
recognizes that the selection of IP regime or the details of economic rights in 
this area will impact the position of the least well-off. The trouble, however, is 
that this says very little about the actual structure or details of the Rawlsian 
account of IP. This insightful point shows instead, that for Rawlsianism, any 
possible IP law is best understood as subject to the two principles of justice, not 
the control of midlevel principles. Any such construction, however, will not, at 
the level of principle, share in Merges's midlevel account given the above 
incompatibility. 
IV. 
BASELINES: COMMONS VS. ANTI-COMMONS AND ASSET PARTITIONING 
For Merges, the midlevel principles of proportionality and nonremoval, 
conjoined with efficiency and dignity, resolve practical questions concerning 
when courts construct open access oriented rules, as opposed to constructing 
rights to exclude. Further, Merges's claim is that, even at the theoretical level, 
foundational values would have little, if any, practical ramifications. Consider 
Merges's question of when and whether courts honor previously granted 
patents. Merges holds several intriguing positions in this regard: (1) courts, do, 
in fact, systematically look to Merges's implicit midlevel principles in 
answering or justifying such questions, 168 (2) in order to properly justify IP 
decisions, courts ought to invoke his midlevel principles in guiding case 
considered in its overall social and economic context. For Rawls, the ... question is whether ... 
the ... existence of private property promotes a fair distribution .... "). 
167. MERGES, supra note 2, at 118. 
168. /d. at 189. 
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outcomes, 169 and (3) even if courts were to appeal to foundational values, any 
set of foundational principles would serve equally well-it would make no 
"operational" or "theoretical" difference whether courts adopted, for example, 
the foundational values of Rawlsianism or utilitarianism. 170 The ideas in what 
follows have significant ramifications for Merges's second and third claims. 
A. The Commons and the Anti-Commons 
Consider the canonical literature on the tragedy of the commons171 and the 
tragedy of the anti-commons, 172 as well as the possible trade-off in an IP law 
regime between the right to exclude173 and the right to a more "open use" 
regime in a Rawlsian context. To use Merges's example, were courts to enforce 
a pre-existing patent, they would be engaged in a specified form of asset 
partitioning. 174 By granting a monopoly to the asset, the court affects the right 
holder's return on investment, which in tum affects his incentives for research 
and development. Competing constructions in the strength of IP rights have 
differential distributive effects by changing incentives and outcomes. For 
example, longer pharmaceutical patents increase profits to pharmaceutical 
producers and correspondingly alter the incentives for innovation. Shorter 
patents may, on average, improve the welfare of the poor by allowing for 
cheaper generic substitute medications. In the context of a forward-looking 
distributive legal scheme such as Rawls's, the hypothetical IP law regime is a 
goal-driven legal construction. 
Merges holds that foundational values are theoretically and operationally 
irrelevant to considerations of whether to construct a more "open access" or 
"commons-like" IP regime. For Merges, the rnidlevel principles, chiefly the 
principle of proportionality, rule. Merges's idea is that courts uphold previously 
granted patents where there is proportionality between the level of economic 
desert possessed by the patent holder and the benefit he or she receives via the 
monopolistic patent construction. Where such a patent holder deserves the right 
to exclude, and the benefits accrued to the right are proportional to the level of 
desert, courts should uphold the patent. On the other hand, where desert is 
disproportionately lower than such benefit, courts ought to and will fail to 
uphold the patent. For Merges, it would make no difference, either at the 
theoretical level or at the level of a judge crafting a legal rule, which 
foundational theory one adopts given the range of application of the midlevel 
principle of proportionality. 
169. !d. 
170. !d. at 10-12. 
171. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
172. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 85, at 698. 
173. On the role of the right to exclude, see, for example, Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and 
Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REv. 965 (2004). 
174. On asset partitioning, see, for example, Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The 
Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000). 
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But to be clear: IP rights of differing strengths have significantly differing 
effects upon both net aggregate wealth and the position of the least well-off. As 
a matter of institutional design, where foundational principles are maximizing, 
the choice of an IP law regime must be a function of such principles. 
Maximizing principles do not construct the indeterminacy in legal institutions 
that Merges's midlevel principles require. In this context, IP rights, where they 
exist, must find their home in a complete set of legal and political institutions, 
which, in conjunction with one another, best serve to meet the demands of the 
distributive principles. 
Thus, the distributive principles define the very terms of what is a tragedy 
of the commons or anti-commons. Too much common ownership may fail to 
meet the demands of the utility principle, creating a utilitarian tragedy. Too 
strong a right to exclude may fail to meet the demands for the difference 
principle, creating a tragedy for distributive justice. Even the moderate Lockean 
philosophy Merges describes will be more tolerant of the aggregate value loss 
than can arise from strong rights to exclude, than a Rawlsian or utilitarian 
might be. 
B. Property Baselines Questions 
This Section demonstrates the normative control that foundations play in 
setting initial property baselines. In the context of such principles, IP rights 
must be constructed in conjunction with all legal other legal and political rules, 
including taxation and transfer; any hypothetical IP regime is no exception. For 
this reason, Merges's midlevel principles are, at the level of principle, 
inconsistent with such foundations. 
By way of illustration, return to Rawlsianism. For Rawls, it is the 
complete set of legal and political rules that must meet the demands of the 
distributive principles. Since, as we have seen, moving forward from the 
original position Rawls's principles of justice are maximizing in their 
application, there is very little indeterminacy in the system for Merges's 
midlevel principles. The IP law regime for a Rawlsian would need to be 
constructed in conjunction with the system of tax and transfer. 
The selection among competing IP regimes, as Merges recognizes, has 
significant effects upon the least well-off and, correspondingly, must be 
constructed in conjunction with an optimal tax and transfer system, unique to 
the two principles of justice. Intra-schemic alterations in the complete set of 
legal rules will require changes in taxation and upset, at the very least, the 
optimal tax rates and tax base, thereby causing a failure to meet the maximizing 
demands of the two principles of justice. 
Legal institutions answer to the demands of the two principles of justice: 
this renders meaningless, in theory, any distinction between IP and taxation. 
When constructed in service of maximizing principles, there is no meaningful 
distinction between a rule of tax law and a rule of property law. For example, 
2013] IP DOCTRINE AND MID LEVEL PRINCIPLES 1347 
consider a legal rule that imposes a 50 percent tax on income. In theory, one 
could understand this rule as a tax rule, a property rule, or even a contract rule. 
The point is that in a Rawlsian context all legal rules are selected because of 
their instrumentalist role in the chosen complete scheme of legal and political 
institutions that satisfy the two principles of justice. 175 
In selecting legal rules and institutions, there is not much latitude, given 
the maximizing demands of the distributive principles. Maximizing principles 
require a specific set of property rules conjoined with an optimal tax rate.176 
Any alterations in the IP regime of the sort demanded by Merges's midlevel 
principles would require compensating changes in tax policy, the result of 
which would be a complete scheme of legal and political rules that would fail 
to maximize. In switching between maximizing foundational principles, one 
must compare complete schemes of legal and political rules that best meet the 
demands of the respective foundational principles. The proper comparison is of 
complete sets of legal and political rules, and this selection is crucially inter-
schemic. 177 One cannot meet the relentless demands of maximizing foundations 
by making only isolated intra-schemic alterations in the IP property regime, as 
the invocation of midlevel principles would require. 
Return now to the central insight of work on the tragedy of the anti-
commons: issuing too many IP rights can create a patent thicket, where 
problems involving holdouts and transactions costs serve to produce less than 
optimal gains in utility or welfare. 178 The important insight can be pushed a 
step further, the conception of what is optimal changes when one shifts 
between maximands. What is optimal for a utilitarian regime (maximizing net 
aggregate utility) cannot also be optimal for a Rawlsian (maximizing the 
position of the least well-off). Each would demand a different set of trade-offs 
between open access and the right to exclude. The property baseline must be 
constructed in service to the distributive principles; the distributive principles 
define the baseline that constructs the commons and defines the conception of a 
"tragedy." 
Consider again Merges's principle of proportionality. Although Merges 
never provides a clear definition of this principle, 179 he appears to have in mind 
a conception of fairness, without articulating the complete details of what his 
conception of fairness entails.180 However, he does discuss the relationship 
between desert and economic benefit. Perhaps Merges's idea is that economic 
175. See Kronrnan, supra note 8. 
176. For an account of the prominent role economic baselines play in answering distributive 
questions, see, for example, Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budgets: A 
Critical View, 54 TAX NOTES 1661 (1992). 
177. THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 66-67 (1989). 
178. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 85, at 698. 
179. MERGES, supra note 2, at 159--60, 189--90 (self-consciously avoiding a specified account 
of proportionality with regard to the definition of specific rights). 
180. /d. at 8. 
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institutions, particularly IP law institutions, ought not to embody arbitrary 
inequalities and, a lack of proportionality is an example of an unfair or 
impermissibly arbitrary inequality. 181 But the idea of proportionality, absent 
any property baselines, is indeterminate. 
The free-floating principle of proportionality is vague. For Rawlsianism, 
however, the justified metric of proportionality is automatically guaranteed by 
Rawls's principles of justice that set all property baselines and details of 
ownership. If an independent principle of proportionality requires anything 
different from that, perhaps embodying an alternative conception of equality or 
fairness, there is no Rawlsian rationale for it. The Rawlsian position is that all 
inequalities must be justified by the two principles of justice, alternative 
inequalities are by definition unjust. Therefore, an IP Jaw construction that 
would be unjust on Merges's conception would be just for Rawls, if required by 
the principles of justice. 
Merges's principle of proportionality balances desert with market 
leverage. However, the "sacrifice" or "contribution" required to establish desert 
for one's creation and the "benefit" derived from market leverage all require 
antecedent normatively salient benchmarks. That is, without an initial baseline, 
the idea of a backward-looking notion of contribution in creation is 
indeterminate. 
The point is subtle: in discussing the proportionality between desert and 
benefit, one implicitly must compare the deservingness and respective market 
leverage of each IP rule under one possible IP law scheme, to the metric of 
desert and market leverage each person would have, were the rules of some 
alternative scheme adopted. However, it is not clear which, if any, comparative 
baseline scheme Merges has in mind in indexing his understanding of 
"proportionality" or "disproportionality." 
Rawlsianism selects the inequality demanded by the two principles of 
justice. But I am unclear why Merges believes a free-floating, independent 
notion of proportionality is morally salient for Rawls and, further, how in the 
Rawlsian post-institutional conception such notions of desert might arise. 
This draws attention to my concerns with Merges's claims that in order to 
properly justify IP decisions, courts ought to invoke his midlevel principles in 
guiding case outcomes, 182 and that even if courts were to appeal to foundational 
values, any set of foundational principles would serve equally well. As he says, 
it would make no "operational" or "theoretical" difference whether courts 
adopted, for example, the foundational values of Rawlsianism or utilitarianism. 
In response to Merges's claims, where foundational principles are maximizing, 
there plainly is, at the level of theory and operation, a significant difference 
181. !d. at 159-60. 
182. !d. at 189. 
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among the required IP regimes. Further, courts operating in a hypothetical 
Rawlsian scheme should reject the substance of Merges's midlevel principles. 
v. 
PATENTS: THE "BUILDING BLOCKS" OF CREATION AND INVENTION, DNA 
PATENTS AND PROMETHEUS V. MAYO AND MYRIAD 
A. Pharmaceutical Patents and Policy 
In what follows, I will try to make clear exactly how wide the 
disagreement among proponents of divergent foundational principles may be. A 
brief discussion is not only illuminating, but will lead naturally to my doctrinal 
discussions of the recent Prometheus v. Mayo 183 decision in the Supreme Court 
and the Federal Circuit's decision inMyriad.184 
First, I address the policy question of pharmaceutical patents and 
particularly their welfare-oriented effects on the developing world. Particularly, 
I will examine both the question about appropriate patent length, and the deeper 
question about whether such patents are even appropriate. Interestingly, this is 
a subject that spawns significant international public debate, and one to which 
Merges deploys intellectual energy. Yet he is unable to remain true to the 
demands of his own midlevel analysis. In addressing the matter, Merges begins, 
contra his own position, with foundational analysis, as opposed to his dispute-
resolving midlevel principles. 185 
Here, the question is often posed as whether pharmaceutical creators and 
inventors can justly bar others from manufacturing and distributing cheap, 
suitable quality, generic pharmaceuticals. Monopolistic patents, the argument 
goes, exist to provide incentives for creators and inventors. Investment in 
pharmaceutical research, development, and creativity is expensive. If we expect 
economically motivated actors to allocate resources in this direction, we need 
an artificial institutional rule constraining the behavior of other economically 
motivated market participants. Thus, investment requires monopolistic 
protection to patent holders against would-be manufacturers of equal quality 
generic substitutions. 
In constructing such a market-limiting legal rule, one balances the optimal 
incentives needed for creators and investors to bring their products to market 
against the loss of market freedom associated with limiting mutually beneficial 
exchange between would-be consumers of cheaper substitute medications and 
183. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
184. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). 
185. MERGES, supra note 2, at 277 ("[I] have couched the pharmaceutical patent issue in the 
language of the various foundational theories[:] ... Locke, Kant, and Rawls, as well as utilitarian 
theory .... Ifl am to stay true to the pluralism I espouse ... it would seem necessary also to discuss 
the issue in terms of the midlevel principles ofiP law."). Here, Merges is essentially conceding that an 
appeal to pluralism and midlevel principles will not dissolve significant and protracted IP law disputes. 
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their would-be manufacturers. The result is a rule that creates institutional 
preconditions and incentives for needed, creative pharmaceutical 
development. 186 
At first glance, the dispute appears to be over the length of time associated 
with such monopolistic rules. One might argue that Rawlsians, utilitarians, and 
Lockeans might disagree over duration of such patents. Lockeans might argue 
in favor of stronger, more restrictive patent rights, so as to provide greater 
protection of the economic interest of the creators, inventors, and investors. 
Rawlsians, on the other hand, would argue for a limitation on freedom, only to 
the extent that such a limitation would maximize the position of the least well-
off. This, alone, is sufficient to show that midlevel principles will not resolve 
disputes over the appropriate level of patent protection 
For Rawlsians, whether such IP rights would even be included in a 
scheme of legal institutions designed to maximize the position of the least well-
off is also in question. Rather than merely questioning patent duration, or 
proportionality between merit and market leverage, the initial inquiry asks what 
ought to be patentable and questions whether there ought to be patents at all. 187 
This, in turn, leads to the doctrinal question of patentable subject matter, 
the question taken up by the Supreme Court in Mayo v Prometheus and by the 
Federal Circuit in Myriad. The next Section shows that these cases provide 
insufficient evidence of midlevel principles in the positive law. Instead, they 
can be seen as invoking forward-looking consequentialist principles in guiding 
their outcomes in a fashion at odds with Merges's midlevel principles. 
B. DNA as Patent Eligible Subject Matter: Mayo and Myriad 
In light of the preceding discussion and the asset portioning and property 
baseline analysis of Parts IV.A and IV.C above, return now to IP doctrine, in 
the context of Mayo and Myriad. These cases show a lack of evidence that the 
courts, in deciding IP cases, invoke midlevel principles of the sort Merges 
espouses. Instead, there is strong evidence of forward-looking consequentialist 
186. See INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PuBLIC HEALTH, supra note 2, at 135, 145. 
187. !d. The conflict for Rawls may be greater than a straightforward disagreement over the 
range of "proportionality" between desert and patent strength. Raw !sian Thomas Pogge, for example, 
argues that justice requires rejecting any scheme of monopolistic patent rights in the pharmaceutical 
context. Instead, Pogge has consistently made an appealing case for the Health hnpact Fund, a scheme 
devised for the creation and invention of pharmaceuticals rooted mainly in innovative taxation and 
transfer mechanisms. For Pogge, much of the needed consequential value of the IP patent system can 
be effectively achieved via creative taxation policy. Pogge argues that his suggestions are not only 
pragmatically wise, but requirements of justice. ("If rich countries and their citizens desire medical 
innovation, then they must find ways of funding it that either leave the [market] freedom of the poor 
unreduced or else adequately compensate the poor for the loss of freedom imposed upon them [via 
monopolistic patents]."). See INCENTIVES FOR GWBAL PuBLIC HEALTH, supra note 2, at 145. My 
present point is that even competing foundational principles may require radically distinct property 
constructions, a disagreement that runs far deeper than the range of Merges's midlevel principles and 
any account of contingent overlapping consensus. 
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reasoning in tension with such principles. This Section holds that midlevel 
principles do not uniformly constitute the positive law of IP and often serve as 
a contrast to it. 
A brief description of Mayo may be helpful. In Mayo Collaborative 
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,188 Prometheus was the sole and 
exclusive licensee of two patents. 189 Mayo bought and used diagnostic tests 
based on Prometheus's patents. 190 In 2004, Mayo announced it would sell and 
market its own, slightly different, diagnostic test. Prometheus immediately sued 
Mayo alleging patent infringement. 191 
. When the case finally reached the Supreme Court, it framed the question 
as "whether the claims do significantly more than simply describe ... natural 
relations . . . . [D]o the patent claims add enough . . . to qualify as patent-
eligible processes that apply naturallaws?"192 The Court answered this question 
in the negative, 193 finding that the claims provided nothing more than a 
description of the natural law with an obvious process to apply them.194 In its 
unanimous decision, the Court maintained that if a law of nature is not 
patentable, then neither is a process reciting a law of nature, unless that process 
has "additional features that provide practical assurance that the process is 
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself."195 
Thus, absent such additional features, a process involving the mere recitation of 
a law of nature remains ineligible for patent for the very reasons that laws of 
nature are so ineligible. 
Notably, the Court's analysis provides a consequentialist rationale for the 
"law of nature" exception to patentability.196 While not mentioning inventor 
desert or merit, the Court maintains that "'[L]aws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas' are not patentable,"197 since the 
"monopolization of [the basic tools of science and technological work] through 
the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend 
to promote it."198 Further, the Court, in discussing proportionality, addresses 
the trade-off between patent ownership and loss of discovery owning to the 
possibility of holdouts, concluding that "upholding [law of nature] patents 
would risk disproportionately tying up the use of the underlying natural laws, 
inhibiting their use in the making of further discoveries."199 
188. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
189. /d. at 1290. 
190. /d. at 1296. 
191. /d. 
192. /d. at 1297. 
193. /d. 
194. /d. at 1298. 
195. /d. at 1297. 
196. /d. at 1293. 
197. !d. (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)). 
198. /d. 
199. /d. at 1294. 
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Although awarding patent protection to the discoverer of a law of nature 
"might well encourage their discovery, those laws and principles ... are 'the 
basic tools of scientific and technological work"'200 and as such, their common 
use is crucial for future discovery and advancement. Therefore, "there is a 
danger that ... patents ... that tie up their use will inhibit future 
innovation .... "201 This danger becomes acute when a patented process merely 
applies the law of nature and thereby blocks more future invention than the 
underlying discovery could justify. 202 
Here, the Court is clearly concerned about stifling growth and innovation 
because upholding such preexisting process patents risks holding up future use 
of the naturallaws.203 Return now to Merges's ideas concerning inventor desert 
and proportionality/04 and recall that for Merges "[t]he Supreme Court takes 
the position [in eBay] that it may in proper cases look behind the leverage 
created by a property right. This inquiry ... reveals the heart of the 
proportionality principle .... The contribution of the property owner is weighed 
against the economic leverage the right provides in actual market 
transactions."205 To be fair to Merges, the Court does discuss a proportional 
relation between the "future innovation ... foreclosed relative to the 
contribution of the inventor. "206 Yet, here, the Court's analysis and rationale is 
consequentialist.207 The point is subtle, but the Court is balancing the inventor's 
consequential "contribution" against the ex ante potential for stifling 
innovation. 
Arguably, consistent with eBay, there is no decisive evidence of Merges's 
principle of proportionality-grounded in the backward-looking notion of 
desert or merit and market leverage-controlling the Court's decision not to 
uphold the preexisting process patents. Instead, the Court appeals to 
200. Id. at 1301 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). 
201. !d. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 1302. 
204. MERGES, supra note 2, at 8 (describing the proportionality principle as partially 
embodying the Lockean pre-institutional desert which straightforwardly conflicts with a 
consequentialist analysis) ("IP law ... tailor[s] a creator's ... right ... [to] reflect[] his contribution. 
This is the proportionality principle. There is a ... Lockean flavor to [it] .... [I]t is about basic 
fairness: the scope of a[n] ... [IP] right ought to be commensurate with the magnitude of the 
[creator's] contribution .... "). 
205. !d. at 167. 
206. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012). 
207. !d. (citing Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REv. 1315 (2011)) 
(invoking a law and economics rationale as opposed to Merges's backward-looking principle of 
proportionality or fairness as reasons for not enforcing preexisting patents involving laws of nature). 
Here, the court notes, "The exclusion from patent law of basic truths reflects 'both ... the enonnous 
potential for rent seeking that would be created if property rights could be obtained in them and ... the 
enormous transaction costs that would be imposed on would-be users [of those truths]."' !d. 
(alterations in original) (quoting WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE EcONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 305--06 (2003)). 
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consequentialist notions of contribution, which are antagonistic to the desert 
component of Merges's backward-looking principle ofproportionality_2°8 
Again, the fact of a trade-off is insufficient to support the claim that 
Merges's deontic, backward-looking principle of proportionality controls. True, 
the Court in Mayo invokes the term "contribution," but this is not Merges's 
backward-looking understanding of the concept. Instead, the Court has in mind 
the forward-looking consequentialist analysis associated with marginal 
product. 209 There is clear evidence for this view in the preceding cited passages 
and the Court's citation to the Landes/Posner transaction costs justification.210 
On the basis of this evidence, the values the court invokes in constructing this 
IP decision are in conflict with Merges's midlevel principles. 
The Federal Circuit's application of Mayo in Myriad provides further 
evidence of a conflict between midlevel principles and the reasoning of courts. 
MyriaJ'' was a companion case to Mayo concerning patent eligibility-
interestingly on a collision course with Mayo. Here, medical organizations, 
researchers, genetic counselors, and patients brought action against a patentee 
and the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), challenging validity of patents 
which claimed isolated DNA sequences associated with predisposition to breast 
and ovarian cancers and diagnostic methods of identifying mutations in those 
DNA sequences.212 
The question before the Federal Circuit was "whether the claims [A.] to 
isolated BRCA DNA, [B.] to methods for comparing DNA sequences, and [C.] 
to a process for screening potential cancer therapeutics meet the threshold test 
for patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in light of various 
Supreme Court holdings,213 particularly including Mayo."214 Perhaps most 
208. MERGES, supra note 2, at 160 (analyzing excessive or disproportionate leverage not in 
consequentialist terms, but in terms of the backward-looking notion of desert) ("By 'excessive' or 
'disproportionate leverage' ... I mean power beyond what a person rightfully deserves.") (emphasis 
added). 
209. For a consequentialist or economic based account of "contribution" in the context of 
abstract ideas, see Lemley et al., supra note 207, at 1340 (2011) ("[C]ourts should consider the 
importance of the patentee's contribution .... [O]verclaiming is about balancing the incentives needed 
for the patentee against the risk of stifling future innovation.") (emphasis added). 
210. LANDES& POSNER, supra note 207. 
211. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). 
212. /d. at 1309. 
213. The Supreme Court's precedents provide three judicially created exceptions to § 101 's 
broad patent-eligibility principles: "'[L]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas' are not 
patentable." Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1290 (2012) 
(quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)). The Court has also referred to those exceptions 
as precluding the patenting of mental processes, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972), and 
products of nature, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980) ("[T]he relevant distinction [for 
purposes of§ 101 is] ... between products of nature ... and human-made inventions."). The Court has 
explained that, "[t]he concepts covered by these exceptions are 'part of the storehouse of knowledge of 
all men ... free to all men and reserved exclusively to none."' Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218,3225 
(2010) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)). 
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pertinent is the court's answer to the first question, where the composition 
claims to isolated BRCA genes are patent eligible. 
The court held that "Mayo does not control the question of patent-
eligibility of such claims,"215 as "[t]hey are ... expressly authorized as suitable 
patent-eligible subject matter in§ 101" of the Patent Act.216 The actual question 
was whether or not isolated DNA falls under the "products of nature" exception 
to § 101. The court held that they do not.217 "The isolated DNA molecules," it 
reasoned "are not found in nature. They are obtained in the laboratory and are 
man-made, the product of human ingenuity."218 Further, the patentee alleged 
that "[t]he claimed isolated DNA molecules are distinct from their natural 
existence as portions of larger entities, and their informational content is 
irrelevant to that fact."219 The court held that "[u]nder the statutory rubric 
of§ 101, isolated DNA is a tangible, man-made composition of matter defined 
and distinguished by its objectively discernible chemical structure."220 
The Federal Circuit explicitly rejected the argument that the DNA patents 
inappropriately preempted laws of nature.221 The court clearly acknowledged 
that "[t]he remand of this case for reconsideration in light of Mayo might 
suggest, as Plaintiffs and certain amici state, that the composition claims are 
mere reflections of a law of nature."222 But the Federal Circuit distinguished 
Mayo, stating that "the Supreme Court in Mayo focused on its concern that 
permitting patents on particular subject matter would prevent use by others of, 
in Mayo, the correlation recited in the method claims."223 For the Federal 
Circuit, "[t]he answer to that concern is that permitting patents on isolated 
genes does not preempt a law of nature. A composition of matter is not a law of 
nature."224 The court declined to acquiesce in the plaintiffs argument that these 
genes are essentially reflections of a law of nature. 225 
Crucially, the court was unwilling to engage with newly advanced claims 
concerning the downstream consequences of these patents. "The question is," 
the court wrote, 
not whether [it is] desirable for one company to hold a patent or 
license covering a test that may save people's lives, or for other 
companies to be excluded from the market encompassed by such a 
214. Ass 'nfor Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1324. 
215. !d. at 1325. 
216. See35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
217. Ass 'nfor Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1325. 
218. !d. 
219. !d. at 1330. 
220. !d. 





2013] IP DOCTRINE AND MIDLEVEL PRINCIPLES 1355 
patent-that is the basic right provided by a patent, i.e., to exclude 
others from practicing the patented subject matter.226 
The court appeared to hold that these negative downstream consequences are 
the inevitable outcome of the justified trade-off between incentivizing research 
into laws of nature and the risk of preempting those laws from future use. As a 
result, any newly introduced adjustment would upset the antecedently justified 
balance, as existing law already contemplates such values and is suffused with 
them. 
Correspondingly, the court held that BRCA genes are patent eligible227 
and declined to directly (re)balance the negative consequences of upholding 
patents, maintaining that the case was "not about whether individuals suspected 
of having an increased risk of developing breast cancer are entitled to a second 
opinion. Nor [was] it about whether ... the owner of the instant patents, or 
Myriad, the exclusive licensee, has acted improperly in its licensing or 
enforcement policies with respect to the patents."228 And notably, the opinion 
reasoned in an incentive-based consequentialist vein, "[ w ]e would further 
note . . . that patents on life-saving material and processes, involving large 
amounts of risky investment, would seem to be precisely the types of subject 
matter that should be subject to the incentives of exclusive rights."229 
Again, it is not that the court considered the above-stated negative 
consequences irrelevant, but rather that the current patent structure and system 
already contemplate such negative outcomes, such that any alterations to the 
existing structure would be worse still in consequentialist terms. Indeed, the 
court highlighted aspects of the current patent structure that antecedently attend 
to such concerns. 230 Even where one remains uncertain that the current system 
is actually justified in consequentialist terms, and there may be very good 
reasons to believe that it is not,231 the present point is that regardless of the 
court's substantive view of the outcome of the balance, the forward-looking 
structure of the court's reasoning conflicts with any backward-looking midlevel 
principles. 
Not all members of the panel, however, fully adopted this view. The 
dissenting opinion in Myriad maintained that Myriad's BRCA gene claims and 
226. /d. at 1324. 
227. /d. at 1326. 
228. /d. at 1324. 
229. /d. 
230. /d. 
[A ]limited preemption is inherent in every patent: the right to exclude for a limited period 
of time. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) ("Every patent shall contain ... a grant to the patentee, his 
heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or 
selling the invention throughout the United States .... "). When the patent expires, the 
public is entitled to practice the invention of the patent. That is true of all inventions; during 
the term of the patent, unauthorized parties are "preempted" from practicing the patent, but 
only for its limited term. 
/d. at 1331 (emphasis added). 
231. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 85 at 698. 
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its claims to gene fragments were not patent-eligible.232 The dissent reasoned 
that "the court's decision, if sustained, will likely have broad consequences ... 
preempting methods for whole-genome sequencing, even though Myriad's 
contribution to the field is not remotely consonant with such effects."233 
The dissent's rationale provides a particularly insightful critique of the 
majority, and one that in part has an affinity with Merges's view. The dissent 
held that "a patent involving a law of nature must have an 'inventive 
concept. "'234 Here, "the applicant claims a composition of matter that is nearly 
identical to a product of nature"235 and the dissent maintained that "it is 
appropriate to ask"236 the backward-looking question, perhaps consistent with 
Merges, of "whether the applicant has done 'enough' to distinguish his alleged 
invention from the similar product of nature. "237 The dissent continued, asking 
rhetorically, "[h]as the applicant made an 'inventive' contribution to the 
product of nature?"238 and interestingly held that "the answer to those questions 
is no."239 
Finally, the dissent also challenged the majority opinion by attending to 
the downstream consequences of the holding. In a clearly consequentialist vein, 
the dissent held that "it is important to consider the effects . . . on the 
biotechnology industry."240 Although the majority had emphasized "industry's 
need of patent protection to encourage and reward research . . . , there [was] 
another side to the coin."241 Such "[b]road claims to genetic material present a 
significant obstacle to the next generation of innovation in genetic 
medicine .... "242 Crucially, "[n]ew technologies are being developed to 
sequence ... even an entire human genome rapidly, but firms developing those 
technologies are encountering a thicket of patents."243 In order to proceed, "a 
firm would have to license thousands of patents from many different 
licensors .... [T]he costs involved ... could be prohibitive."244 
232. Ass 'n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1348 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
233. !d. 










244. !d. The opinion notes that "existing studies 'have focused relatively little attention on 
downstream product development' and that ... the costs associated with the patent thicket are 'quite 
real in the calculations of product-developing finns."' /d. (quoting Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonprob/em? Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research, 45 Hou. L. REv. 1059, 1076-80 (2008)). 
2013] IP DOCTRINE AND MIDLEVEL PRINCIPLES 1357 
Return to Merges's midlevel principles and the case for their unification 
with competing foundations. In addressing the question of whether or not the 
court will uphold previously granted patents, there is, as in eBay, insufficient 
convincing evidence of Merges's midlevel principles controlling the majority 
opinions in Mayo and Myriad. 
Yet, the question of the patentability of small snippets of DNA, although 
in the less broad context of patent trolls, is of interest to Merges. He holds that 
courts fail to uphold preexisting patents where the proportionality between 
owner's desert and market leverage is unfair?45 
Interestingly, there are the makings of a view akin to Merges's in Myriad. 
The dissenting opinion arguably discusses the backward-looking notion of 
desert and its relationship to market leverage. The dissent holds that the 
plaintiff had not "done enough"246 to deserve or merit such market leverage via 
patent. At the same time, the dissent is clearly concerned with the downstream 
negative consequences of the majority's holding. Conjoining these two 
concerns, there are the makings of Merges's proportionality principle: a test of 
the relationship between desert and market leverage. But setting the remarks of 
the Myriad dissent aside, the Myriad majority argues in a forward-looking 
consequentialist fashion, as opposed to the backward-looking desert analysis 
embodied in Merges's midlevel principle of proportionality. 
The conceptual issues over patentability run a good deal deeper than a 
proportionality analysis of this type may lead one to believe. There is a "law of 
nature" exemption to patentability.247 But the bounds of the exception cannot 
be resolved by appeal to the backward-looking notion of desert. The very idea 
of the exemption is that even the fruits of honest industry are not patent eligible 
if they constitute a law of nature, whether the inventor deserves reward or 
248 a· h · f h · h · 1 not. IVen t e ex1stence o t e exceptwn, t e queshon must a ways come to 
245. MERGES, supra note 2, at 160-61 (describing the court's ultimate unwillingness to 
uphold initially granted unfair patents on "short snippets" of DNA, as an example of courts invoking 
his backward-looking notion of proportionality, although in the context roughly of "patent tolls") 
("[S)hort snippet patent[s), intrinsically worth very little when granted, might come to generate very 
substantial revenues .... [W)hat bothered me about it was a sense of disproportion: these very minor 
patents ... on gene snippets could ... have [become) worth huge amounts of money."). 
246. Ass 'nfor Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1355. 
247. MERGES, supra note 2, at 142 (discussing his rnidlevel principle of non-removal, but 
avoiding a precise definition. Instead, he provides illustrations of it. He writes "not all information can 
be protected with IP rights," and concerning patentable subject matter, "no one can obtain exclusive 
rights over basic mathematical or scientific formulas or laws of nature."). But, as I argue, actual zones 
of non-removal demand detailed boundaries that require antecedently specified property baselines. The 
free-floating demand of non-removal requiring a public domain provides insufficient grounding and 
detail. What is needed is a prior account of the specific details of that domain. In this, proponents of 
different foundational principles will stridently disagree, for example, over the question of whether or 
not DNA ought to be patentable. 
248. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) ("[A) new mineral 
discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, 
Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of 
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a balance between the consequential gains and losses (ex ante and ex post) 
between constructing a monopolistic patent rule and assigning the asset to the 
commons. Desert is not at issue where the very question is one of patentability. 
Conceptually, what is needed is a definitive account of property baselines, 
establishing what can and cannot be owned, where on the basis of such 
baselines, it is antecedently given that laws of nature, among other things, 
cannot. 
Shortly before this Essay went to print, the Supreme Court rendered its 
opinion in Myriad.249 The Court again provided a forward-looking incentive-
based analysis of the justification of patent law. The Court's stated justification 
is based in social welfare, not the rights of inventors. Further, the Court holds 
that the proper test of a "new and useful . . . composition of matter" is a 
function of social utility, not inventor merit.250 And the structure of the Court's 
reasoning in Mayo and the Federal Circuit's reasoning in Myriad's majority 
opinion show that midlevel principles, of the sort Merges describes, do not 
universally control IP case outcomes. Given these counterexamples, the claim 
that midlevel principles consistently or universally regulate the positive law of 
IP is unfounded. 
gravity. Such discoveries are 'manifestations of ... nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to 
none."') (quoting Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)); 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) ("Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental 
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific 
and technological work"). 
249. The Myriad decision was released on June 13, 2013,just before this article went to print. 
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., No. 12-398, 2013 WL 2631062 (U.S. June 
13, 2013). 
The rule against patents on naturally occurring things is not without limits, however, for "all 
inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, or abstract ideas," and "too broad an interpretation of this exclusionary 
principle could eviscerate patent law." As we have recognized before, patent protection 
strikes a delicate balance between creating "incentives that lead to creation, invention, and 
discovery" and "imped[ing] the flow of information that might permit, indeed spur, 
invention." We must apply this well-established standard to determine whether Myriad's 
patents claim any "new and useful ... composition of matter," or instead claim naturally 
occurring phenomena. 
!d. at *7 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). In terms of inventors' rights, the Court notes, 
"Myriad found the location of the BRCAl and BRCA2 genes, but that discovery, by itself, does not 
render the BRCA genes 'new ... composition[s] of matter,' that are patent eligible." !d. at *8. The 
Court continues, "Myriad did not create anything. To be sure, it found an important and useful gene, 
but separating that gene from its surrounding genetic material is not an act of invention 
Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry." !d. 
Further, the Court states, "Myriad seeks to import ... extensive research efforts into the § 101 patent-
eligibility inquiry .... But extensive effort alone is insufficient to satisfy the demands of §101." !d. 
Instead, what the court requires is the satisfaction of the above forward-looking standard that balances 
the social value of incentives leading to creation, invention, and discovery with transaction costs and 
holdouts. For purposes of patentability, this standard, as opposed to one based in inventors' rights or 
merit, defines such terms as "creation," "act of invention," etc. 
250. !d. at *I. 
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CONCLUSION 
A close study of seminal IP cases has demonstrated through 
counterexamples that midlevel principles are not uniformly embodied in the 
positive law of IP. eBay and Ethicon and Mayo and Myriad confirm the strong 
overarching thesis of this Essay: midlevel principles are not rigorously 
constitutive of the positive law of IP. Correspondingly, midlevel principles 
cannot systematically serve to explain, describe, or predict case outcomes. 
There is a lack of evidence of midlevel principles in the majority opinion in 
Mayo which constructs the rules concerning patentability in a forward-looking, 
incentive-based fashion. The same holds true of the Federal Circuit's majority 
opinion in Myriad. 
Further, there is a conceptual conflict between midlevel principles and 
forward-looking max1m1zmg foundational property principles. 
Correspondingly, those holding differing foundational views of property will, 
at the level of principle, disagree over IP case outcomes. Any claim to the 
unification of midlevel level principles, of the type Merges defends, and 
foundational theory in IP law is untenable, both at the level of principle and at 
the level of legal doctrine. 
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